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INTRODUCION
The State of California is the world's seventh largest economy,' yet
it is in the midst of its worst economic slump since the Great Depression.
In 1991 and 1992, California recorded the largest budget deficits of any
state in United States history.' The magnitude of the problem is clear
when one realizes that the expected 1993-94 California budget gap reached
twenty-two percent of the State's total budget of $55 billion.4 Besides the
shortfalls, California Governor Pete Wilson signed the 1992-93 State
Budget sixty-four days later than required by the State Constitution.5
Governor Wilson signed California's 1993-94 budget fifteen days later
than California's Constitution mandates and less than three hours before
the State's 1992-93 fiscal year expired.6 With a $7.5 billion annual deficit
predicted for 1994, California's budget woes seem here to stay.7
Presently, the California Constitution requires the Legislature to pass
the State budget by June 15th of each year.8 California's Constitution also
I. Haya El Nasser, Drowning Golden State Gropes for Lifeline, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1993, at 3A.
2. See Stryker McGuire& Andrew Muir, California in the Rearview Mirror, NEWSWEEK, July 19,1993,
at 24,25 (reporting California's current economic condition and discussing its impact). In 1991, personal income
dropped in California for the first time since the late 1930's. Martha Groves, The California Puzzle, L.A. TIES,
Jan. 31, 1993, at Dl. A recent study ranked California's economy last in the nation. Carl T. Hall, In Study of
State Economies, California is Ranked 51st, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 1992, at Al (citing the release of a study
by the Chicago investment firm Kemper Securities); see also California's Golden Dreams Tarnish in Sea of
Disasters, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1993, at C2 (profiling California's continuing economic slump).
3. Daniel B. Wood, California Governor Wilson Tries to End a Losing Streak, CHRISTIAN So.
MONITOR, Jan. 6, 1993, at U.S.1 (noting that California's 1991 budget deficit of $10.7 billion and 1992 deficit
of $14.5 billion were the largest state deficits in United States history).
4. Vlae Kershner, How California's Tax Policies Brought on a Crisis, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 1991, at
Al. California's budget shortfalls are proportionally the same size as the federal deficit. Id. The federal deficit
is estimated to reach 22.7% of the total federal budget of $1.4 trillion. Id. Budgetary shortfalls are tentative
estimates of the year-end deficit if the Governor and the Legislature do not act to change the situation. Daniel
Weintraub, $75 Billion State Budget Gap Forecast, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1992, at Al.
5. Ann Bancroft & Vlae Kershner, No More IOU's-State Is Back on a Cash Basis, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
4, 1992, at A26 (reporting the signing of California's 1992-93 State budget 64 days late); California Budget
Crisis Ends, CHISTIAN SCI. MoNITOR, Sept. 3, 1992, at 2 (detailing the end of California's budget stalemate).
6. Daniel M. Weintmub & Jerry Gillam, Wilson Signs $52.1 Billion Budget on Time, L.A. TIMs, July
1, 1993, at Al; Dan Bernstein, $52.1 Billion State Budget Beats Clock, SACRAMENtO BEE, July 1, 1993, at Al.
The "on time" and "beating the budget clock" references in the articles' titles cited directly above refer to the
budget's passage before the expiration of the fiscal year, not meeting the June 15th deadline for passing the
budget. See, e.g, Ed Mendel, Governor Happily Signs Budgetf-JState Enters Fiscal Year with a Spending Plan,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB, July 1, 1993, at Al; Robert Gunnison, Wilson Signs $50.6 Billion State Budget,
Schools Get Their Money-Welfare Funds Cut, S.F. CHRON., July 1, 1993, at Al.
7. Jon Matthews, $7.5 billion State Deficit Likely by '94, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 20, 1992, at Al
(noting that the California Legislature's Legislative Analyst, Elizabeth Hill, forecasted that the 1994 deficit may
be as high as $9.3 billion).
8. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(c).
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requires the Legislature to pass the budget bill by a two-thirds vote of both
houses.9 In nineteen out of the last twenty-two years, California's
Legislature has failed to enact the State budget by the constitutional
deadline.' ° Both observers and participants in the process consider the
two-thirds vote requirement a significant factor in these budgetary
impasses."
Proponents of the two-thirds vote to pass California budgets might
argue that since the 1993-94 budget passed with relative ease when
compared to the 1992-93 budget the two-thirds vote requirement is not an
issue. The problem of enacting California budgets should not, however, be
measured year to year. California has had a long tradition of missing
budgetary deadlines even when economic conditions were much better than
they are now. Therefore, even though the 1993-94 budget process may
suggest to some the absence of a problem, given California's history and
current economic situation, the problem still remains.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss what role the California
Constitution's two-thirds vote requirement plays in the State's inability to
enact budgets, and to propose a change in California's budgetary
requirements. Part I of this Comment examines California's two-thirds vote
requirement and the implications of the requirement on the Legislature's
ability to efficiently conduct business.12 Part HI reviews the mechanics of
California's State budget process, and studies the influence of the two-
thirds vote requirement in California's 1992-93 budget battles.13 Lastly,
9. Id. art. IV, § 12(d).
10. California State Retirements Insufficient to Prevent Layoffs, THE BUREAU o NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
30 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 1467, at 781 (1992) (discussing California's budgetary
problems and their possible effect on California State employees).
11. See Walter Zelman, California's Stalemated Government, SACRAM MNTO BEE Aug. 5, 1990, at Forum
1 (attributing California's budgetary deadlock to the two-thirds vote requirement); David Roberti, Preventing
Hostage Budget Requires Legislative Reform, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 1990, at A15 (crediting the two-thirds vote
requirement for the budgetary deadlock in the California Legislature). David Roberti is the President Pro
Tempore of the California State Senate. Id. See Boatwright, infra note 111 (citing the two-thirds rule as a cause
of budgetary stalemate); SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS Ov CALIwoRNIA, Summary of 1992-1993 Budget Action,
1 (1992) (listing the two-thirds vote requirement as one reason why enacting the 1992-93 budget took so long);
John Jacobs, California's Two-Thirds Gridlock, SACRAMENTO BEE, March 14, 1993, at F4 (predicting that
gridlock will continue in the California Legislature as long as the two-thirds vote requirement to pass California
budgets is in effect); Dan Berstein, TWo-Thirds Vote Aids Budget Gridlock Opponents Say, SACRAMENTO BEE,
April 5, 1993, at A4 (discussing the increased criticism of the two-thirds vote requirement); see also infra notes
39-68 and accompanying text (discussing implications of the two-thirds voting requirement).
12. See infra notes 15-68 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 69-162 and accompanying text.
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Part II suggests the elimination of California's two-thirds vote requirement
to pass State budgets and discusses methods of achieving that change.
14
L CALIFORNA'S MODERN LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE
The Constitution of 1879 established the State's government in the
form we know it today.'5 California's Constitution separates state
governmental powers into three branches: legislative, executive and
judicial. 16  The State legislative branch consists of two houses: the
Assembly and the Senate.'7
Each year, California's Legislature responds to California's changing
needs by enacting thousands of new state laws or changing existing
ones."8 Provisions of California's Constitution establish the procedures
and requirements for the Legislature to pass this legislation. 9 Most
significantly, the California Constitution imposes different vote
requirements for the passage of different types of legislation."
14. See infra notes 163-252 and accompanying text.
15. See BERNARD L. Hym, ET A.., PoLIIcs AND GOVERNMENT IN CALPORNA 20 (12th ed. 1989)
(describing the California Constitution of 1879). The Constitution of 1879 expanded California's first
Constitution of 1849. Id. The Constitution of 1879 was more detailed and specific than its predecessor. Id. See
generally HENRY A. TURNER & JOHN A. VIEG, THE GOVERNMENT AND PoITnIcs OF CAuFORNmA 26 (4th ed.
1971) (comparing California's constitutions of 1849 and 1879).
16. CAL. CONST. art. M, § 3. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, art. 1I, and art. I (establishing the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of the United States government).
17. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Assembly has eighty members and the Senate has forty members. Id.
art. IV, § 2(a).
18. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAuomNA, GUIDE TO CAuPO.NIA GOVERNMENT 29 (14th ed.
1992) [hereinafter LEAGuE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNm] (discussing the legislative powers of the
California Legislature).
19. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (providing for the introduction, passage and effective date of statutes);
cf id. art. IV, § 12 (establishing specific provisions for the introduction, passage and effective date of budget
bills and other bills authorizing spending of pubic money). See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text
(discussing California's budget process and its specific requirements),
20. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d) (distinguishing between appropriations bills and non-appropriations
bills); id. art. IV, § 8(d) (distinguishing between urgency and non-urgency bills). The 1879 constitution did not
base vote requirements on the subject matter of the proposed legislation. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IV., § 15
(establishing procedures and requirements for the passage of a bill). However, a two-thirds vote of both houses
is required to override a gubernatorial veto. Id. art. IV, § 16.
1993 / Enacting The California State Budget
A. The California Legislature's Two-Thirds Vote Requirement
The California Constitution provides that the Legislature must pass
bills by a majority vote.2" Passing bills by a majority vote requires only
forty-one votes in the Assembly and twenty-one votes in the Senate
regardless of number of members who actually do vote.22 In addition to
the simple majority vote requirement, the constitution also imposes a more
stringent two-thirds vote requirement on the Legislature to pass many types
of legislation. Fifty-four votes in the Assembly and twenty-seven votes in
the Senate are needed to pass bills requiring a two-thirds vote, similarly
disregarding the actual number of members that do vote.
The current California Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of both
houses of the. Legislature in several situations, including the following: 1)
changes in state taxes enacted to increase revenue;' 2) approval of
appropriations bills, including the state budget, except those funding
schools;24 3) overriding the governor's veto of a bill or budget item;'
21. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b); see LEAGUE OF WOMEN VoTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 18, at 36
(defining a bill as a proposal to alter, supplement, or rescind an existing law). The California Constitution also
requires a majority vote of the Legislature to remove directors or appeals board members of the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22. Similarly, the California Legislature must pass acts
taxing banks, corporations, franchises, and insurers by a majority vote. Id. art. XIII, §§ 27-28.
22. Id. art. IV, § 2(a).
23. Id. art. XUIA, § 3. The constitution specifies that both increases in tax rates and changes in
computation methods require a two-thirds vote. Id.; see infra note 64 (discussing the effects of Proposition 13).
24. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d). The two-thirds vote requirement has been interpreted to apply only to
appropriations from the state general fund. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 717 (1979); see City of Los Angeles v. Post
War Pub. Works Review Bd., 26 Cal. 2d 101, 116, 156 P.2d 746, 755 (1945) (quoting Ryan v. Riley, 65 Cal.
App. 181, 187, 223 P. 1027 (1924)) (defining "appropriation" as a setting apart from the revenues of a certain
sum of money for a specified purpose); County of Orange v. Flournoy, 42 Cal. App. 3d 908, 914, 117 Cal. Rptr.
224, 227 (1974) (citing City and County of San Francisco v. Kuchel, 32 Cal. 2d 364, 366, 196 P.2d 545 (1948))
(stating that appropriation legislation need not take any certain form, but an intent to appropriate must be clear);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an "appropriation bill" as a measure before a law-
making body that permits the spending of public moneys in a specified manner). The two-thirds voting
requirement, as it applies to the budget process, has its roots in a Depression Era California tax reform program.
See Memorandum from California Legislature Senate Office of Research to California State Senator Bill Lockyer
2-3 (Dec. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Memorandum] (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reviewing the
history of the two-thirds vote rule as it applies to the adoption of California budgets). The tax program, known
as the Riley-Stewart Plan, was put on the ballot by 1933 Senate Constitutional Amendment 30. STATUTES AND
AaDMENrTs TO THm CODES OF CAUFmRNiA 3072 (1933) (providing the text of 1930 Senate Constitutional
Amendment 30, enacted as Chapter 63); id. atxc (noting that Chapter 63 appeared on California's June 27, 1933
Special Election ballot as Proposition 1). The amendment specified that any appropriations during the next two
years, except those for public schools, could not exceed 5% of the prior year's appropriations without a two-
thirds vote of the Legislature. SECRETARY OF THE STATE OF CALFORNIA, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTrnON AND PROPOSITIONS, SPECIAL ELECnTON JUNE 27, 1933, at Pt. 11 p. 1 (providing the text of
Proposition 1). Proponents of Proposition 1 argued that its purpose was to help lift California from its economic
crisis and instability by equalizing taxation and returning billions of dollars to local government. Id. at Pt. I p.
3. Nineteen State Senators signed the argument in favor of Proposition 1. Id. No arguments against Proposition
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4) enactment of an urgency statute;26 5) legislation to submit to the voters
a constitutional amendment27 or state obligation bond act;28 and 6)
suspension for one year of the constitutionally required minimum funding
for school and community college districts.29
Requiring more than a simple majority vote of the Legislature to take
action is not a new concept in the California Constitution. 0 California is
among only a handful of American states that demand more than a
majority vote, or what is generically' termed a supermajority vote, to take
I appeared in the ballot pamphlet. Id. A clear majority California voters approved the measure. SECRETARY OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, SPECIAL ELECTION JUNE 27, 1933, at 12 (June 1933)
(reporting that the ballot measure received 717,319 votes in favor and 440,413 votes against). In 1962,
Californians passed ballot Proposition 16, which made technical corrections in the Constitution and formulated
the current version of the two-thirds vote requirement as it applies to appropriations bills. See STATUTES AND
AMENDMENTS TO THE CODES OF CALIFORNIA 5044 (1961) (providing the text of Assembly Constitutional
Amendment 11, enacted as Chapter 255); STATUTES AND AMENDMENTS TO THE CODES OF CALIFORNIA cxxviii
(1963) (stating that Chapter 255 appeared on California's November 6, 1962 General Election ballot as
Proposition 16); see also Memorandum, supra (reviewing the history of the two-thirds vote rule as it applies to
the adoption of state budgets). The language of California Constitution § 12(d) specifically exempts
appropriations for public schools from the two-thirds vote requirement. CAL CONsT. art. IV, § 12(d). California's
1993-94 State budget devoted $18.5 billion or 48.1% of the State's total budget to kindergarten through high
school and higher education. Pete Wilson, Governor of California, California State Budget 1993-94, at 3 (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journa).
25. CAL CoNsT. art IV, § 10(a).
26. Id § 8(d); see id. (defining an "urgency statute," sometimes referred to as an "urgency bill," as one
needed to preserve the public peace, health or safety). Urgency statutes go into effect immediately upon their
enactment. Id § 8(c)(3).
27. Id. art. XVIII § 1; see JOsEPH ALLAN BEEK, THE CALIFORNIA LEOiSLATURE 235 (7th ed. 1974)
(defining a constitutional amendment as a resolution affecting the constitution, adopted by the Legislature or
presented by initiative, requiring an affirmative vote of the voters to become effective).
28. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. State obligation bonds also must be approved by a majority vote of
Californians. Id Bonds are interest bearing loans to the government which the government promises to repay
at the end of a specific time period. An "obligation bond" is a bond repaid using funds from California's General
Fund. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALFORNIA, supra note 18, at 167. The General Fund, used to finance
most of California's operations, contains monies which are not specified by law to go to any other fund.
RICHARD KROLAK, CALIFORNIA'S BUDGET DANCE: ISSUES AND PROCESS 112 (1990). The other types of funds
used in California, generically referred to as "special funds," are used in areas where state money is designated
by law for a particular use. Id at 115.
29. CAL CONST. art. XVI, § 8(h). The listing in the text is not exhaustive. See id art. XA § 4 (requiring
a two-thirds vote to amend, repeal or add to Division six of the Water Code, so long as the action taken does
not reduce that division's protections); see also id. art. VII § 2 (requiring a two-thirds vote to remove a member
of the State Personnel Board); id. art. IV §, 4(b) (mandating a two-thirds vote to define travel and living
expenses for Members of the Legislature). California's Constitution requires more than a two-thirds vote in only
one situation. See id. art. IV, § 8(a) (specifying that three-fourths of the Legislature must agree to suspend the
Constitutional requirement that bills may not be acted upon until 31 days after they are introduced into the
Legislature).
30. See CAL CoNsT. of 1849, art. IV, § 17 (requiring two-thirds vote of the Assembly and the Senate
to override a Governor's veto); id. art. IV, § 18 (specifying that the Senate must approve by two-thirds a
conviction for impeachment).
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action on certain types of bills.31 Over time, the number of circumstances
where Californians have desired a two-thirds vote has increased
dramatically.32 For example, some of the 480 successful amendments33
to the California Constitution since 1884 have placed supermajority voting
requirements upon the Legislature.34
31. See 28 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 177 (1990-1991) (listing those
states whose legislatures are required to take certain actions or pass certain bills by extraordinary votes).
California is one of only five American states to require an extraordinary vote to pass tax bills in its Senate. Id.
at 175. The other four states are Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana and South Dakota. Id. Most states do not require
a supermajority vote to enact fiscal or tax legislation. Id. at 175-77. Only California, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Delaware, Louisiana and South Dakota require an extraordinary vote for tax measures to pass the lower house
of their legislatures. Id at 177. Additionally, California is among only five states, including Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and South Dakota, that require more than a majority vote to pass revenue increasing bills in the
State budget context. Id at 290-91.
32. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (citing specific instances where a two-thirds vote is
currently required by California's Constitution).
33. California's Constitution may be changed three ways; The first method is by Legislative amendment
or revision. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. This method allows the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote, to propose
an amendment or revision to the Constitution. Id. To take effect, the proposed amendment must be approved
by a majority of California's voters. Id. art. XVIII, § 4. See generally 29 THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERME , THE BOOK OF STATES 22 (1992-93) [hereinafter THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS]
(comparing state constitutional amendment procedures by state governments). An amendment is more limited
in scope and typically affects only one or more constitutional provisions. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE JOINT
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMrTIm, THE CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
18 (Nov. 28, 1990). A revision is considered a more substantial change of the entire constitution. Id.; see
Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular
Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1478 (1987) (noting that the distinction between
an amendment and a revision is simply a matter of degree because both involve adopting new constitutional
language). The second method of changing the California Constitution is by constitutional convention. CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. The Legislature may, if approved by a two-thirds vote, put before voters the question
of whether to call a constitutional convention, Id. If a majority of voters approve a convention the Legislature
has six months to provide the convention. Id. Delegates to the convention are elected by voters, Id. To take
effect, any proposed revisions or amendments must be approved by a majority of California's voters. Id. art.
XVIII, § 4. See generally THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 25 (comparing procedures for
calling state constitutional conventions). The third method of changing the California Constitution is a ballot
initiative. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. Initiatives may be proposed by first submitting a petition signed by a
constitutionally specified number of voters to California's Secretary of State. Id. art. II, § 8(b). The Secretary
of State must place the proposal on the next statewide general election ballot at least 131 days after the proposal
qualifies or at any statewide special election. Id. art. II, § 8(c). Initiatives dealing with more than one subject
are not eligible to be submitted to the voters and have no effect. Id. art. II, § 8(d). In order to become effective
a majority of voters must approve the initiative. Id. art. XVIII, § 4. The only other states that allow for
constitutional amendment by initiative are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 24. See EUGENE C. LEE, 6 CALIFORNIA POLICY CHOICES,
CHAPTER 10: REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE INITIATIVE PROCESS, (1990) (detailing the specifics of
the initiative process). See generally Kara Christenson, Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65,
Note, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1031, 1033 (1989) (examining the history of initiatives in California).
34. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNM TS, supra note 31, at 20. California is second only to Alabama,
which has had 538 constitutional amendments, in the number of constitutional amendments adopted. I.
Californians have used ballot initiatives several times to implement two-thirds vote requirements. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to call a constitutional convention as
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Moreover, some of California's current two-thirds vote requirements
were included in the original language of the 1879 California
Constitution.35 The implications of the history and widespread application
of the two-thirds vote requirement in California are of great
consequence.36 In the 1960's and 1970's, the requirement played an
important role in the final outcome of two significant issues facing
California: water delivery between northern and southern California and
property tax reform.37 In addition, as recently as the 1992-93 budget
negotiations, the two-thirds vote requirement hampered the California
Legislature's ability to pass a budget on time.3 8 The implications of the
two-thirds vote requirement have not, however, been limited historically
within the context of the California budget. The two-thirds vote
requirement has created difficulty in the passage of other legislation
essential to California as well.
B. Implications of California's Two-Thirds Vote Requirements
Supermajority voting requirements significantly enhance the power of
the minority party in the California Legislature by allowing it to prevent
the passage of many important pieces of legislation.39 This partially
required by Proposition 16 on the November 3, 1970 ballot); id art. XIIIA, § 3 (requiring a two-thirds vote to
increase tax rates or change computation methods as mandated by Proposition 13 on the June 6, 1978 ballot);
id. art. XVI, § 8(h) (requiring a two-thirds vote to suspend minimum funding levels for schools or community
colleges as mandated by Proposition 98 on the June 5, 1990 ballot). The California Legislature has also used
ballot initiatives to implement two-thirds vote requirements. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d) (requiring a
two-thirds vote to enact an urgency bill as required by Proposition IA on the November 8, 1966 General
Election ballot). Proposition IA was the product of 1966 Assembly Constitutional Amendment 13. SECRETARY
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNmA, CALiFoRNLA VOTERS PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTON NOVEMBER 8, 1966, at
Pt. H, p. 1 (providing the text and background of Proposition IA). California voters approved Proposition IA
by a large majority. SECRETARY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, GENERAL ELECTION
NoVEMBER 8, 1966, at 27 (Nov. 1966) (reporting that Proposition lA received 4,156,416 votes in favor and
1,499,675 votes against).
35. See CAL. CONST. art IV, § 10(a) (requiring a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature to
override a Governor's veto); id. art. IV, § 18(a) (requiring a two-thirds vote in the State Senate to convict for
impeachments).
36. See infra notes 39-68 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the two-thirds vote
requirement).
37. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text (describing the two-thirds vote requirement's effect on
the Legislature's enactment of the Bums-Porter Act and attempts at property tax reform).
38. See infra notes 111-162 and accompanying text (detailing the effects of the two-thirds vote
requirement on the enactment of the 1992-93 California State budget).
39. See WALTER ZELMAN, 5 CALIFONmA POLICY CHOICES, CHAPTER 12: POLMCAL STALEMATE AND
DRIFr (1989) (characterizing supermajority voting requirements as potentially both threatening and protecting
democracy); see also MICHAEL J. Ross, CALIFON'IA: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLmcs 153 (3d ed. 1987)
(discussing the holdout role the minority party can play in budgetary legislation); Interview with Steve Larson,
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defeats the democratic ideal of rule by majority. 40 Supermajority votes
effectively prevent California's Legislature from responding to specific
public demands, at least as far as the majority of legislators perceives
them.41 Highly partisan legislatures, such as California's, enhance the
minority party's power when combined with two-thirds vote requirements
because minority support is frequently needed to enact legislation. 4' The
highly partisan voting practices of the California Legislature exacerbate the
inherent difficulties created by the supermajority voting requirements. 43
When one explores the significant impact such voting requirements have
had on two particular pieces of California legislation, the problems created
by supermajority voting requirements are evident.44
In 1959, the California Constitution required a two-thirds vote of both
houses of the Legislature to place state obligation or general bond
obligation acts on a Primary ballot.4 However, if the proposed bond act
was to be voted on during the General election in November, a simple
majority vote would be sufficient to place the act on the ballot.46 In 1960,
Chief of Staff, California State Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee, in Sacramento, CA (Nov. 4, 1992)
[hereinafter Interview] (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (characterizing the two-thirds voting
requirement as an obstacle in all circumstances); infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text (highlighting that the
outcomes of two significant pieces of legislation were determined by the two-thirds vote requirement).
40. See ZELmAN, supra note 39, at 248 (commenting on the impact of minority power on democratic
principles); see also Ross, supra note 39, at 153 (discussing the minority party's role in stalling agreement on
budgetary legislation to have its demands met); Interview, supra note 39 (characterizing the two-thirds voting
requirement as a real restraint on the California Legislature, limiting the ability of the majority to rule).
41. See Z.MAN, supra note 39 (discussing the value of supermajority voting requirements).
Supermajority voting requirements have been described as obstructions to harnessing political power. Id.
42. See Andrea Margolis & Richard Zeiger, Bleeding Hearts, Stone Hearts: A California Journal Survey
of Legislative Voting Records, CAL. J. 30 (Jan. 1987) (characterizing California's Legislature as highly polarized
along party lines). A determined minority party will gain substantial leverage if it can gather enough votes to
deny the required two-thirds. KROLAK, supra note 28, at 3. As of December 14, 1992, during the 1992-94
session, the Democrats controlled both the Assembly and the Senate with 48 out of 80 and 22 out of 40 seats
respectively. Quick Reference Guide to the California State Legislature, SACRAMENTO NEwsL, December 14,
1992, at 3-4. As of December 14, 1992, Senatorial districts 2 and 16 were vacant and two members were
Independent. Id The political party division of California's Legislature is illustrated by a recent study indicating
that 83% of California's Legislators voted along party lines 85% of the time. Margolis & Zeiger, supra, at 30-33.
The survey studied 47 bills during California's 1985-86 Legislative session to categorize the voting records of
both individual Legislators and each house as a whole. IE
43. See Margolis & Zeiger, supra note 42 (describing the results of a recent study of degree of
partisanship of voting practices of the California Legislature).
44. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text (discussing two specific instances where the two-thirds
vote requirement affected the outcome of legislation).
45. CAL. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 1 (amended 1962).
46. Id. This constitutional provision distinguished between the General Election and Primary Election
ballot by specifically requiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to place such measures on Primary Election
ballots while imposing no special requirements for placement on the General Election ballot. Id. See generally
Albert S. Rodda, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of California State Government: Does it Encourage
Responsible Democratic Representative Government? (Sept. 15, 1991) (unpublished paper) (copy on file with
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 25
the Legislature utilized this provision of the California Constitution to pass
the Burns-Porter Act, placing it on the November General Election
ballot.47 The Burns-Porter Act, approved by voters in November of
1960,48 authorized the construction of the state water project which
currently supplies water to southern California from northern California.49
The year after the Burns-Porter Act was passed, the California
Legislature and voters approved an amendment to the constitution that
removed the distinction between primary and general election ballots in
terms of bond acts.5" As a result, California's Constitution now requires
a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to place all state bond acts before the
voters regardless of whether the Legislature places a bond act on the
primary election or the general election ballot.5' The Burns-Porter Act
might not have passed had the new two-thirds vote requirement been in
effect when the Legislature considered it, and consequently would not have
been placed before the voters.52
The two-thirds vote requirement has also impacted a second area of
California legislation, the problem of property taxation. In the late 1960's
the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing California's political and legislative structure during the Pat Brown
gubernatorial administration). Albert S. Rodda served as a California State Senator from 1958-1980. Id. at ii.
47. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1762, sec. 1. at 505 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12930-12941). In the Senate,
the bill secured twenty-five ayes and twelve noes; two aye votes short of two-thirds, but four votes more than
necessary to pass by majority. 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA 2943 (1959 Regular Session) (citing
the Senate's passage of SB 1106 on May 29, 1959). In the Assembly, the bill received fifty ayes and thirty noes;
four aye votes short of two-thirds, but nine votes more than necessary to pass by majority. 4 JOURNAL OF THE
ASSEMBLY OF CALIFORNIA 5661 (1959 Regular Session) (reporting the Assembly's passage of SB 1106 on June
17, 1959).
48. SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER
8, 1960, at 23 (Nov. 1960) (reporting the official results of the 1960 General Election). The ballot measure
received 3,008,328 votes in favor and 2,834,384 votes against. Id.
49. See 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1762, sec. 1, at 505; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note
18, at 82 (describing the California State Water Plan created by the Burns-Porter Act); see also MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT. THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 366-67 (1986) (detailing the history
of water resources in California); RICHARD B. HARVEY, TE DYNAmics OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND
POLrrTICs 203 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing California's longstanding political conflict over water in the context of
the State Water Project).
50. 1960 Cal. Stat. ch. 35, sec. 1, at 505 (amending CAL. CONST. art XVI) (1960 1st Extraordinary
Session) (passing Assembly Constitutional Amendment (ACA) 6); SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
STATMENT OF THE VOTE, CONSOLDATEm DmECr PRIMARY ELECTION PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION
SPECIAL ELECTION JUNE 7, 1960 (June 1960) (identifying Proposition 3 as ACA 6 and as amending CAL.
CONST. art XVI, § 1); see CAL. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1 (as amended June 7, 1960) (requiring a two-thirds vote
of the Legislature to submit bond proposals to the people for their approval).
51. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (as amended June 7, 1960) (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature
to submit bond proposals to the people for their vote).
52. The Act passed by such a slim margin that, while it passed by a majority vote, it did not gather
enough votes to pass by two-thirds. See supra note 47 (citing the vote record of both the Assembly and the
Senate on the Burns-Porter Act).
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and 1970's, nearly ten years after passage of the Bums-Porter Act, the
California Legislature attempted to respond to spiraling increases in
property taxation by enacting extensive property tax reform. Throughout
this period California's constitution required a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature to pass bills which would increase taxes on personal
property.
"4
More than a dozen tax relief measures were introduced in 1976 alone,
but a divided California Legislature was unable to reach a consensus on
the tax reform issue.' The Legislature made a final attempt to enact tax
reform legislation on the last night of the 1977 legislative session. 6 The
Assembly passed Senate Bill (SB) 154 and Governor Jerry Brown
committed to signing it into law. 7 However, Senate Republicans and
three Democrats, rejected the bill, thereby denying SB 154 the needed
two-thirds vote.5 ' As a result, the California Legislature failed to pass
much needed tax reform.59 This failure to enact tax reform prompted
supporters of the Jarvis and Gann Tax Reform Association to work toward
53. Between 1967 and 1977 the Legislature enacted 19 measures aimed at relieving the property tax
burden. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMMIrEE, FAcTs ABOUT PROPOSITION 13, THE
JARViS/GANN INITIATIVE, 58 (1978). During this period California voters attempted to implement property tax
relief. In 1968, Proposition 9, proposing a 1% limit on the tax rate, was defeated. Id at 7. In 1972, Proposition
14, which proposed to limit the tax rate from 1.75% to 2%, also failed. Id
54. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (repealed Nov. 5, 1974 by Proposition 8). Proponents of Proposition 8
argued that its purpose was merely to make the California Constitution easier to read and understand, but not
to change California's tax structure. SECRETARY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECION NOVEMBER 5, 1974, at 31 (Nov. 1974). No ballot argument against Proposition 8 appeared
on the ballot Id.
55. See LENNY GOLDBERG, TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION: A CnzEN'S GUIDE TO REFORMING
PROPOSITION 13 at 4 (1991) (noting the California Legislature's failure to provide property tax relief); TERRY
CHRISTENSON & LARRY GERSTON, THE CALIFORNIA CONNECTION 211-12 (1984) (detailing the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of Proposition 13).
56. 4 J. SENATE CAL. 7251 (1977-78 Regular Session) (reporting the Senate's consideration of SB 154
on Sept. 15, 1977). Senate Bill 154 sought, inter alia, to revise the method of calculating maximum property
tax rates to allow local agencies to receive specified amounts of tax revenue and to provide property tax
assistance payments to qualified homeowners or renters. CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, SB 154 3-4 (as amended
June 22, 1977); see Rodda, supra note 46, at 19 (describing the 1977 Legislature's attempts to enact property
tax reform).
57. 5 J. ASSEMBLY CAL. 8662 (1977-78 Regular Session) (reporting the Assembly's passage of SB 154).
The Assembly approved SB 154 on Sept. 2, 1977, by a vote of 56-22, exceeding the required two-thirds by two
votes. Id; see Rodda, supra note 46, at 19 (documenting Governor Jerry Brown's commitment to sign SB 154).
58. 4 J. SENATE CAL. 7345 (1977-78 Regular Session). The Senate cast twenty-one votes in favor of the
bill, and fifteen votes against. Il The measure would have passed had a majority vote requirement been in place
at the time. Id.
59. Id
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the passage of property tax reform in California.6' The Association's
efforts were instrumental in the ultimate qualification,6' approval,62 and
judicial affirmation of the property tax reform initiative commonly known
as Proposition 13.63 The adverse effects of Proposition 13 have been
widespread and significant.64 The events leading to the passage of
Proposition 13 epitomize how the supermajority vote requirement can
prevent the Legislature from enacting laws clearly supported by a majority
of California's legislators.65
As shown above, supermajority voting requirements mandated by the
California Constitution have played an important role in at least two
significant pieces of California law, the Bums-Porter Act and Proposition
13.66 Just like the Bums-Porter Act, Proposition 13, or any other
60. Kershner, supra note 4. Lenny Goldberg, head of the California Tax Payer's Association, attributes
Proposition 13 to the Legislature's failure to respond to a tax system out-of-control. Id. See generally Rodda,
supra note 46, at 19 (discussing the events leading to Proposition 13).
61. The constitution requires supporters of a proposed initiative to gather signatures equal in amount to
8% of the total votes cast in the last gubernatorial election in order to qualify the proposition for the ballot. See
CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 8(b). In the 1978 election 499,846 signatures were required to qualify. SECRETARY OF
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, PRIMARY ELEcnoN JUNE 6, 1978, at vi (June 1978). The
association gathered 1,264,000 million signatures in qualifying Proposition 13. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REVENUE
& TAXATION COMMIE, supra note 53, at 1.
62. See SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORN[A, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 6,
1978, at 39 (June 1978) (reporting the official results of the 1978 special election). Proposition 13 received
4,280,689 (64.8%) votes in favor and 2,326,167 (35.2%) votes against. Id.
63. See Nordlingerv. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326,2336 (1992) (upholding the validity of the property taxation
system established by Proposition 13); see generally Steven T. Lawrence, Note, Solving the Proposition 13
Puzzle: From Amador to Nordlinger-Judicial Challenges and Alternatives, 24 PAC. LJ. 1769 (1993)
(examining California's property taxation system and the most recent challenge to the system, Nordlinger v.
Hahn).
64. One year after Proposition 13 was enacted approximately 100,000 public sector jobs were eliminated.
GOIBERG, supra note 55, at 4. Under Proposition 13, California has lost an estimated $120 billion in tax
revenue. Id. Revenues of local government and schools have dropped by about $7 billion since the enactment
of Proposition 13. Paying the Price of Proposition 13, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1981, at 124B (detailing the financial
effects of Proposition 13). Also, the ability of schools to raise funds locally has been virtually eliminated.
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATuRE, JoiNT LEISLATIVE BUDGET COMMrrEE, PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER 6
(1987). Proposition 13 requires lawmakers to pass tax increases by a two-thirds vote, making enactment of state
tax increases in California very difficult, even where a majority of the members favor it. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA,
§ 3 (adopted by Proposition 13) (specifying the vote requirement necessary to increase state taxes); see
GOLDBERG, supra note 55, at 52 (characterizing the two-thirds vote requirement to raise taxes as the single most
powerful tool used by special interests to protect their advantages under California's tax scheme); see also supra
notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the minority party when supermajority votes are
required).
65. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing the California Legislature's attempts at
property tax reform which were approved by a majority of the Legislature).
66. See 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1762, sec. 1, at 4234 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE § 12930-12941); CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIA (enacted by Proposition 13 on June 6, 1978); see also supra notes 47-65 and accompanying
text (discussing the Burns-Porter Act and the California Legislature's attempts at property tax reform); supra
notes 22-29 and accompanying text (citing instances where the California Constitution requires a supermajority
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legislation proposed by the Legislature, the budget bill is also subject to
Constitutional restrictions on its passage. 67 A supermajority voting
requirement is one of those restrictions, and it plays a pivotal role in the
California Legislature's ability to pass budgets by the constitutionally
mandated deadline. 6'
I. CALIFORNIA'S BUDGET
California's annual budget bill is one of the most important pieces of
legislation enacted by the State Legislature.69 It impacts nearly every
facet of life.7 If California's current fiscal year expires before a budget
for the next fiscal year is enacted, the State is no longer authorized to
spend money from the State Treasury.7"
Without authority to spend, the State may be forced to issue registered
warrants to creditors or to not pay its creditors at all.72 Issuing these
warrants is costly both in terms of the interest the warrants bear and in
terms of their potential negative effect on the State's financial health.73
vote).
67. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (establishing waiting periods for legislative action, the requirement for
three readings of a bill, the effective date of statutes, and providing for urgency statutes); id art. IV, § 12
(creating the procedures governing budget bills).
68. See infra notes 111-144 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the two-thirds vote
requirement on the 1992-93 California budget process); notes 145-162 and accompanying text (examining the
effects of the 1992-93 budget impasse).
69. See KRoLAI, supra note 28, at 1-2 (characterizing the state budget as the most significant policy
document created by a state government in any given year). A state budget is the State's official authorization
to spend money. Il The State budget is also considered the monetary reflection of state policy and programs.
CHARLES G. BELL & CHARLES M. PRica, CAumORNIA GoVEmm NTf TODAY: PoLTrIcs oF REFORM? 250 (3d
ed. 1988).
70. See generally KROLAX, supra note 28, at 1-2 (describing the policy importance of a state budget).
71. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (providing that money may be drawn from the Treasury only by
appropriation or warrant); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17300 (West Supp. 1992) (defining and authorizing issuance
of warrants). A budget from a preceding year is not automatically reappropriated if no budget act is passed for
the upcoming year. Op. Cal. Leg. Counsel, 1958 AJ. 64 (2nd Ex. Sess.). California's fiscal year begins on July
1 and ends on June 30. JoHN H. CuLvER & JOHN C. SYER, POwER AND POLrmcsjt CALIFORNtA 201 (3d ed.
1988).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17300 (West Supp. 1992) (defining and authorizing issuance of registered
warrants). On July 1, 1992, California issued registered warrants for the first time since the Great Depression.
Kari Zimmerman, From A-OK to IOU, CAL. I., Sept. 1992, at 426.
73. Bancroft, supra note 5 (reporting the effects of California's issuance of registered warrants); see Joyce
Price, California's Treasury Issues IOU's: Empty Coffers affect 324,000, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at AS
(describing the effects of California's issuance of registered warrants). This year registered warrants paid 5%
interest. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Credit Markets: S & P Stuns Bond Market By Cut in California Rating, N.Y. TIMs,
July 16, 1992, at D15. California issued $3.4 billion worth of registered warrants during the 1992-93 budget
crisis. Robert Reinhold, 63 Days After Its Cash Ran Out, California Passes Austere Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 1992, at Al.
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For example, California's most recent issuance of registered warrants in
the summer of 1992 adversely affected the State's credit rating with major
ratings services.74 The downgrading of the State's credit rating adversely
affects California's ability to sell bonds and raise revenue, or at least
makes the process significantly more expensive. 75
Given the importance of the California budget and its impact on the
state's fiscal future, parties involved in the process try to maximize gains
while giving away as little as possible.76 In California, however,
agreement by a majority of legislators is insufficient to approve a budget
bill.77 Only two other American states, Arkansas and Nebraska, require
more than a majority vote to pass standard budget legislation.78 In
California, the group that controls one-third of either chamber of the
Legislature effectively retains veto power over the entire budget.79
74. Martha Groves & Virginia Ellis, S & P Drops State's Bond Rating to A-+, L.A. TIMS, July 16, 1992
at A3 (describing the downgrading of the state's credit rating). Moody's, another major credit rating agency,
reduced California's credit rating on July 6, 1992. Id.; see 3rd Agency Lowers State Bond Rating, L.A. To.ins,
Feb. 15, 1992, at A28 (discussing California's downgrading by Fitch Financial Services); Gilpin, supra note 73
(reporting Standard & Poor's criticism of California's widespread issuance of warrants); Lou Cannon, Taxers
and Spenders: The Hard Reality, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1992, at C7 (characterizing California as a national
laughing-stock after its issuance of registered warrants). California's credit rating fell from one of the nine top
rated states to one of the four worst rated states. Bancroft, supra note 5.
75. See LEAcUE OF WoMEN VO rEs OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 18, at 167 (discussing bond ratings and
their effect on a state's ability to raise revenue). Bond ratings depend on the state's ability to raise enough
money to guarantee regular payments to the bond purchaser. The lower the bond, rating the higher the interest
rate that State taxpayers must pay on bonds. lId A spokesman for California State Treasurer Kathleen Brown
warned that higher interest rates on California bonds could cost the state $200 million over the next 30 years.
Bancroft, supra note 5. According to Brown, the downgrading could cost taxpayers as much as $85 million in
additional interest costs over the life of twenty-year $10 billion bonds pending issuance. The downgrade could
also affect $13 billion in state bonds already issued, if holders elect to sell them rather than hold them until
maturity. Groves, supra note 74 (describing Standard & Poor's downgrading of the state's credit rating).
76. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the important and lasting policy role the
state budget plays in California).
77. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 12(d) (requiring a two-thirds vote to pass the budget).
78. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERMENTS, supra note 33, at 355-56 (comparing state constitutional and
statutory budgetary provisions). Arkansas law requires a three-fourths vote to pass state budgets. ARK. CONST.
art. V, § 39 (requiring a three-fourths vote of Arkansas' General Assembly to appropriate more than $2.5 million
for any two-year budget period, except monies to pay State debts). Nebraska law requires approval of three-fifths
of its Legislature. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (establishing a three-fifths vote requirement to make appropriations
in excess of those recommended by the Governor). Maine requires a two-thirds vote for the emergency
enactment of a budget. ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 16 (requiring a two-thirds vote to enact emergency bills).
79. Barry Keene, Why the Budget is Always Late, SAN JOsE MER CuRY Naws, July 3, 1991, at B3 (citing
the two-thirds majority vote requirement to pass a budget as the reason why California failed to meet its June
15 budget deadline). Barry Keene is a former California State Senator from District 2 in Vallejo. Id. California's
Constitution formally empowers only the Governor with veto power. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a). See supra
note 38 (discussing the power of the minority party).
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While an integral part of the budget process generally, the two-thirds
vote requirement played an especially important part in 1992.80 Future
budgets will likely be affected by the requirement as well.8" The
complexities of the California budget process as a whole must be explored
to better understand how the two-thirds vote requirement affects the
budget's passage. 2
A. The Budget Process
California is one of seven states whose budgetary process is
constitutionally mandated.83 The entire process, which ideally should last
eighteen months, begins when the various agencies within the executive
branch develop budgetary figures.84 By January 10th of each year, the
Governor must submit an itemized budget proposal to the Legislature for
the following fiscal year.85 Unlike other bills, the budget bill is always
introduced by either the Chairperson of the Assembly Ways and Means
Committee, or the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee.86
Once the bill has been introduced, the Legislative Analyst's Office
(LAO) prepares comprehensive evaluations of and recommendations on the
Governor's budget proposal.' In February of each year, the LAO releases
80. See infra notes 110-143 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the two-thirds vote
requirement on the passage of the 1992-93 budget); notes 145-162 and accompanying text (examining the effects
of the 1992-93 budget impasse).
81. See infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text (discussing predictions of California's economic
future).
82. See infra notes 83-110 (summarizing the California budgetary process).
83. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMEN, supra note 31, at 171 (comparing the Legislative
appropriation processes of all 50 states). The other states whose budgetary processes are mandated by their state
constitution are Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York and West Virginia. Id.; see CAL. CONST.
art. IV, § 12 (establishing California's budgetary process).
84. CULV-R, supra note 7 1, at 202. ThIe initial part of the process, which lasts for the first twelve of the
eighteen months, is not open to the public. Id.; see infra notes 108-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
1992-93 budget process, which lasted a total of 22 months).
85. CAL. CoNsr. art. IV, § 12(a) (establishing the mechanics for the budget process); see supra note 71
(defining California's fiscal year).
86. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(c) (providing that the budget bill must be introduced by the chairpersons
of the committees considering appropriations). Authorship rotates between the chairpersons each year and the
chairpersons must introduce the bill regardless of whether they agree with it. CuLVER, supra note 71, at 205.
87. CULVER, supra note 71, at 206. The Legislative Analyst's Office is charged with providing all
members of the Legislature with an independent evaluation of all measures, including ballot measures, which
expend public funds. Id. In their analysis, the Legislative Analyst will report on each item of appropriation and
make recommendations on them. NoEL J. STOWE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT:. THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE .131
(1975). The Analyst may also suggest changes in certain areas in order to promote efficiency and cut
expenditures. Id. Responding to Legislative budget cuts mandated by Proposition 140, passed by California
voters in 1990, the Assembly has refused to continue funding for the LAO beyond the 1992-93 fiscal year.
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its analysis to the Legislature, which holds public hearings in
subcommittees over a ten week period.88 During mid-May, the Governor
usually submits an updated version of the budget proposal to the
Legislature which reflects revisions in budgetary figures.8 9 The budget
bill should arrive on the floor of the Legislature for a vote by the end of
May.90
The California Constitution requires that the budget bill be passed no
later than June 15.91 Due to this early passage requirement, it must be
enacted as an urgency bill, also requiring a two-thirds vote,92 which goes
into effect immediately upon the Governor's signature.93 However, if
either house of the Legislature amends the budget bill in committee, the
other chamber must adopt identical amendments in order for the bill to
pass. 4 If either house of the Legislature fails to adopt the amendments
of the other, a conference committee is convened to resolve the
differences. 95  A great deal of bargaining and compromise must take
Assembly to Pull Plug on Analyst, SACRAMEwo NEWSL, Jan. 4, 1993, at 2. The Senate, however, has pledged
to support the LAO during the 1993-94 fiscal year. Id; see generally California Senate Office of Research, After
the Election: Analysis of Successful Propositions on the November 1990 Ballot 11 (1990) (analyzing policy
effects of Proposition 140); Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, Requiem for an Institution: California's Legislature, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at M6 (discussing the ramifications of Proposition 140).
88. CULVEP, supra note 71, at 206. The subcommittee hearings typically include a critique of a
department's budget by an LAO analyst, testimony from members of the department under review, testimony
from legislators not on the subcommittee, and testimony from private citizens and activists. Id. at 207.
Subcommittees generally concern themselves only with areas where the governor's request and LAO's
recommendations are different. Id Referral to subcommittee versus full committee is significant to the final
determination of the budget for two reasons: (1) subcommittee members have the opportunity to acquire more
expertise in the area over which their subcommittee has jurisdiction; (2) budgetary decisions made at the
subcommittee level are concentrated in the hands of very few legislators. Id. For example, each subcommittee
of the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee consists of three members, so only two votes are required
to recommend budget amendments to the Senate. Id. The various subcommittees of the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee are composed of five to seven members, sojust three or four votes are needed to recommend
budgetary changes to the Assembly. Id
89. CULvER, supra note 71, at 207.
90. lI
91. CAl. CONST. art. IV, § 12(c) (setting the June 15 deadline for passage of a budget bill); Id. art. IV,
§ 12(d) (requiring two-thirds vote to pass appropriations bills).
92. Id. at § 8(d).
93. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c)(3). Normally bills go into effect on January 1 following a 90-day waiting
period from the statute's date of enactment. Id. at § 8(c)(1).
94. TEMPORARY JOINT RULES OF SENATE AND AssEMLY, Rules 25-27 (1991-92) (establishing bill
amendment rules); see BEEK, supra note 27, at 231 (defining amendment as a change either made or proposed
to a bill, motion, or clause); id (defining "adoption" as approval or acceptance, usually applied to amendments
or resolutions).
95. TwpoRARY JOINT RuL oF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 28 (1991-92) (providing for the
establishment of conference committees). A conference committee is a group of six members, with three
representatives appointed from each house, who consider matters on which the houses cannot agree. Id. The
Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly each select two members from the majority group
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place in this committee to achieve the necessary two-thirds vote.96
Ordinarily, the conference committee report is returned to the floor of each
house during the second week in June, just a few days before the
constitutionally mandated deadline of June 15.' Should either house not
adopt the report by the required super majority vote, another conference
committee will normally be called and this portion of the process
repeats.98
When both houses pass the bill, it is then presented to the Governor for
signature.99 Once the Governor signs the bill, it becomes law.0 Rather
than sign the bill, the Governor may veto the entire bill"0 ' or exercise
line item veto power to reduce or strike individual items of the bill. 2
The Legislature may, in turn, override the Governor's veto by a two-thirds
vote.' o3
When the budget process is complete, California's budget actually
consists of three separate types of legislation.'l 4 The first is the actual
statutory budget language, referred to as the budget bill, which allocates
money to the various state agencies and programs.'0 5 The second is
supplemental language consisting of legislative intent and findings stating
and one member from the minority group in the disagreement to sit on the conference committee. Ua at Rule
28.1. Meeting and reporting procedures of the conference committee are governed by the Joint Rules. hId at Rule
29. Though the committee may adopt modifications by a simple majority vote, it usually works to achieve
consensus instead. BEEK, supra note 27, at 234. The committee often achieves compromise by striking offending
language or inserting new amendments. Ia. The amendments must be adopted by each house in order to pass.
TEmnoRARY JoINrr RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 30 (1991-92).
96. See STOwE, supra note 87, at 133 (discussing use of the budget conference committee), Should the
committee be unable to settle the problems the required two-thirds may be difficult to achieve. I.
97. CULVER, supra note 71, at 210 (discussing legislative amendment to the Governor's budget proposal);
see CAL. CONST. art. IV. § 12(c) (setting June 15th as the deadline for passage of the budget).
98. See CULVER, supra note 71, at 210 (discussing legislative amendment to the Governor's budget
proposal). A maximum of three conference committees may be appointed on any one bill. TEMPORARY JOINT
RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 29 (1991-92). In the last 10 years, the Legislature has never appointed
a new conference committee on the State budget. Interview, supra note 39.
99. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
100. Id. Bills not returned by the Governor within 12 days of presentment become law without the
Governor's signature. Id. at § 10(b)(3). But see id. at § 10(b)(1) (providing that if the Legislature, by its recess
to reconvene in the second year of its session, presents bills to the Governor that affect election districts, the
Governor will have 30 days to consider the bills); id. at § 10(b)(2) (allowing the Governor 30 days to consider
bills passed by the Legislature before September I in the second year of its session and presented to the
Governor on or after September 1).
101. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
102. Id. art. IV, § 10(e). The Governor has line item veto power only over appropriations bills. Id But see
Harbour v. Deukmejian 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1102, 742 P.2d 1290, 1305, 240 Cal. Rptr. 569, 584 (1987) (refusing
to allow the Governor to apply line item veto power to portions of a budget implementation bill).
103. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
104. See Interview, supra note 39 (describing the three types of budget language).
105. Id
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specifically how funds are to be used. 1°6 The third type are trailer bills,
which change California law as needed to accommodate any changes
required by the budget bill itself."°
Gathering the required votes in both the Assembly and Senate to pass
the budget bill, the first type of legislation referred to above, is a
determinative step in the budget process."' The 1992-93 budget process
proved to be no different. 9 The two-thirds vote requirement played an
meaningful role in the California Legislature's ability to pass the 1992-93
budget within its constitutionally dictated time frame.1 °
B. The Effects of the Two-Thirds Vote Requirements on the 1992-93
Budget Process
In recent years it has become increasingly difficult to formulate a
budget acceptable to both two-thirds of the Legislature, and to the
governor by the required deadline."' Increasingly, both observers and
participants blame the super majority requirement for the budget
impasses."' The 1992-93 budget was not signed by the Governor until
September 2, a full sixty-three days after the constitutionally specified
106. Id The supplemental language bills are not appropriation bills because they do not authorize the
expenditure of funds and consequently require only a majority vote. Compare CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b)
(requiring a majority vote for the passage of bills) with id. art. IV, § 12(d) (requiring two-thirds vote to pass
appropriations bills). See also supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (describing types of California
legislation requiring supermajority votes).
107. Interview, supra note 39 (describing the three types of budget language). The actual budget bill itself
lacks the legal authority to change laws currently in effect. BELL, supra note 69, at 255. The Legislature uses
trailer bills to make required changes in statutes or programs to implement the new budget. KROL.AK, supra note
28, at 44; Linda Dailey Paulson & Richard Zeiger, Blundering Toward a Budget, CAL. J., Sept. 1992, at 429
(defining a "trailer bill" as legislation that permits the spending contained in the budget bill itself). See generally
Richard Thomson & Robert Fairbanks, Trailer Bills: The Legislature's Incredible Hulk, CAL. J., Sept. 1983
(discussing the origins of the trailer bill).
108. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d) (providing that no budget bill may be passed without two-thirds
vote).
109. See infra notes 111-143 and accompanying text (exploring the effects of the two-thirds vote
requirement on the 1992-93 budget process).
110. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (providing the constitutional deadlines for the introduction and passage
of the budget).
111. November Ballot Propositions, CAL. J. at 6 (1992); see Daniel Boatwright, To End Chaos Legislature
Must Drop Two-Thirds Rule, VAL.EY TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990 at 15A (noting that as of 1990, seven of
California's 12 prior fiscal years had begun without a budget in place). Daniel Boatwright is a California State
Senator from District 7. Id
112. See supra note 11 (citing California legislators who criticize the role of the two-thirds vote
requirement in California's budgetary process).
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deadline. 13 The recorded votes on the various bills proposed during the
1992-93 budget process suggest that critics of the super majority vote
requirement are correct in their assessment that the requirement creates
budgetary gridlock in the California Legislature." 4
During the budget process for the 1992-93 fiscal year, the California
Legislature introduced several bills in an effort to pass a State budget."'
Only one of the bills, Assembly Bill (AB) 979, gathered the necessary
two-thirds vote to pass and become California's budget."6 Three of the
bills introduced, AB 2303, Senate Bill (SB) 1280 and SB 1533, failed to
receive the required vote." 7 The budget process actually began, however,
in January, 1992 with the introduction of companion bills" 8 AB 2303
and SB 1280, both of which were introduced as the "Budget Act of
1992."'' 9
1. Assembly Bill 2303
On April 2, 1992, the Assembly read AB 2303 for a third time on its
floor, as required by the California Constitution, and brought the bill to a
vote.'2 As an urgency bill, AB 2303 required two-thirds, or fifty-four
113. Reinhold, supra note 73 (describing California's passage of a 1992-93 budget); see CAL. CONST. art.
IV, § 12(c) (specifying that the Legislature must pass a budget by June 15).
114. See infra notes 120-144 and accompanying text (discussing attempted 1992-93 budget bills).
115. The bills, all introduced in the 1991-92 session, were: AB 2303, 1991-92 Legislative Session (1992)
(introducing a bill to make appropriations for the support of the State government); SB 1280, 1991-92
Legislative Session (1992) (introducing a bill to make appropriations for the support of the State government);
SB 1533, 1991-92 Legislative Session (1992) (introducing a bill that would have revised the budget bill); AB
979, 1991-92 Legislative Session (1992) (as-amended Aug. 29, 1992) (amending an existing bill to make
appropriations for the support of the government of the State).
116. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 587, at 1831 (West) (enacting AB 979 as the Budget Act of 1992). In the
Senate, the bill received 33 ayes and five noes. FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, AB 979
(Roberti), (Aug. 29, 1992). The Assembly cast 54 ayes and 24 noes and passed the bill by the minimum required
to achieve two-thirds. FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, AB 979 (Roberti) (Aug. 29,
1992).
117. See infra notes 120-144 and accompanying text (detailing the failures of AB 2303, SB 1280, and SB
1533).
118. See JAY M. SHAFRfTZ, THE DORSEY DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PoLrICS 53
(1988) (defining "companion bills" as identical bills introduced separately into each House of a two house
legislature).
119. AB 2303, California State Assembly, 1991-92 Legislative Session (as introduced Jan. 9,1992) (1992);
SB 1280, California State Senate, 1991-92 Legislative Session (as introduced Jan. 9, 1992) (1992). See generally
SENATE DEMOcRAnC CAucus OF CAFORmA, supra note 11, at 9-11 (detailing the chronology of the 1992-93
California budget).
120. FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, AB 2303 (Vasconcellos), AB 2303
Vasconcellos third reading urgency, (Apr. 2, 1992); see CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b) (mandating that the
legislature not pass any bills that have not been read by title on three days in each house). This requirement may
be waived by a two-thirds vote. kd
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out of eighty votes, to pass." The bill received forty-five ayes and
thirty-one noes.'22 Thus, though the bill received a majority of the votes
cast by the Assembly, it nevertheless failed because of the supermajority
vote requirement' 2"
On April 6, 1992, the Assembly reconsidered an amended version of
AB 2303 which removed the urgency and appropriation language so that
the bill only required a majority vote to pass. 24 In this vote, the measure
received forty-five ayes and thirty-two noes, therefore passing."3 The
bill, however, could not enact a State budget without appropriation and
urgency language. 26 The Senate received the bill the same day and
assigned it to the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review.' 27
The Committee took no action on AB 2303 and the Joint Rules of the
Legislature prevented it from being reconsidered later in the same
session. 2 8
2. Senate Bill 1280
The companion bill to AB 2303, SB 1280, passed through the Senate
and was sent to the Assembly on April 30, 1992.129 The Assembly
passed the bill and sent it back to the Senate for concurrence with
121. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d).
122. FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, AB 2303 (Vasconcellos), AB 2303
Vasconcellos third reading urgency, (Apr. 2, 1992). Of the ayes, 45 were Democrats and zero were Republicans.
Ia4 Of the noes, one was a Democrat and thirty were Republicans. Id.
123. Id.
124. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (requiring a majority vote to pass a typical bill).
125. FLOOR ROLL CAI.L VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, AB 2303 (Vasconcellos), AB 2303
Vasconeellos third reading, (Apr. 6, 1992). Of the ayes, 45 were Democrats and zero were Republicans. li. Of
the noes, one was a Democrat and 31 were Republicans. Id.
126. Standing Rules of the Assembly, Rule 66.6 (1991-92) (requiring language of appropriation to
appropriate funds); see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (explaining why urgency language is necessary
to enact a State budget).
127. See California Bill Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 2303 (1992), available in
LEXIS, Cal library, Catrck file. The Joint Rules specify that in even numbered years the last day for each house
to pass bills is August 31. Therefore, AB 2303 expired at the end of the 1990-92 session. TEMPORARY JOINT
RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 61 (1991-92). This requirement may be suspended by a two-thirds vote.
Id. at Rule 61(i); see also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (noting that California's regular two-year legislative
session convenes at noon on the first Monday in December of each even-numbered year and adjourns at
midnight on November 30 of the following even-numbered year).
128. See TEMPORARY JOINT RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 62(a) (1991-92) (requiring that bills
not receiving committee consideration or failing to get the required votes to pass the committee not be
considered again during that session).
129. California Bill Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Senate Bill 1280 (1992), available in LEXIS, Cal
library, Catrck file.
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Assembly amendments" The Senate refused to concur on May 7, 1992,
thus creating the need for a conference committee. 31
After a series of failures to adopt the conference committee report on
the floor of the Assembly, and a series of reconsiderations, 3 2 the bill
once again reached the Assembly floor for a vote. 3  On August 10,
1992, the Assembly cast forty-six ayes and twenty-three noes for the
conference report on the Assembly floor."M This was a mere eight votes
short of the required two-thirds supermajority.135 The Senate took up the
report the same day.136 The report received twenty-four ayes and thirteen
noes, thus failing to receive the needed two-thirds vote. 37 Again, the
measure received a clear majority of the votes cast, but less than the
required two-thirds. 38 Had the constitution required only a majority vote,
the bill might have passed the Senate and the Senate might then have
forwarded the bill to the Governor, for possible signature, almost three
weeks before the date the budget was actually signed.
39
130. CAIFORNIA LEGiSLAKEUR, ASSEMBLY DAILY J., May 6, 1992, at 6759 (documenting the Assembly's
passage of SB 1280); see TEMPORARY JoINT RuLEs OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 26 (1991-92) (specifying
that a house must either concur or refuse to concur in amendments made to a bill in the other house).
131. CALIFORNIA LFOIsLATURF, SENATE DAILY J., May 7,1992, at 5841 (documenting the Senate's refusal
to concur with the amended version of SB 1280); see TEMPORARY JOINT RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY,
Rule 28 (1991-92) (requiring the establishment of a conference committee when a house refuses to concur in
the other house's amendments); see also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (defining a conference
committee and discussing its role in the budget process).
132. The conference committee report was rejected in the Assembly on June 23 and August 9, 1992 and
once in the Senate on June 23, 1992. California Bill Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Senate Bill 1280
(1992). available in LEXIS, Cal library, Catrck file (listing the dates of actions taken on the bill).
133. California Bill Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Senate Bill 1280 (1992), available in LEXIS, Cal
library, Catrek file; see TEMPORARY JoiNT RuLEs OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 62(a) (1991-92) (providing
for reconsideration of committee reports); BEEK, supra note 27 (defining "reconsideration" as a motion which,
when granted, allows another vote nullifying or validating a prior action).
134. FLOOR RoLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, SB 1280 (Alquist) (Aug. 10, 1992). Forty-
six Democrats and zero Republicans voted in favor with zero Democrats and 23 Republicans voting against Id.
135. See id.; CAL. CONST. art. W, § 12(d) (requiring a two-thirds vote to pass appropriations bills); see
also TEMORARY JOINT RULES OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, Rule 29 (1991-92) (requiring a two-thirds vote to
adopt conference committee reports on the budget bill).
136. See California Bill Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Senate Bill 1280 (1992), available in LEXIS,
Cal library, Catrck file (listing the dates of actions taken on the bill).
137. FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, SB 1280 (Alquist) (Aug. 10, 1992). Twenty-
three Democrats and one Republican voted in favor with two Democrats and 11 Republicans voting against. Id.
138. FLOOR RoLL CALL VOTE, CALORNiA STATE ASSEMBLY, SB 1280 (Alquist) (Aug. 10, 1992) and
FLOOR ROLL CALL VOTE, CA ORNIA STATE SENATE, SB 1280 (Alquist) (Aug. 10, 1992).
139. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a) (specifying that every bill passed by the Legislature will be
presented to the Governor for signature). If the bill is signed by the Governor, it becomes law. Id.
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3. Senate Bill 1533
SB 1533 proposed an amendment to the budget bill."4 On August
31, 1992, the Assembly overwhelmingly passed SB 1533 with sixty votes
cast in favor and eleven against. 141 The Senate cast twenty-four votes in
favor and eight votes against the bill the same day. 142 The bill failed to
pass because it received three votes less than the twenty-seven required to
pass the Senate by the two-thirds requirement.143 Had a majority vote
requirement been in effect, this measure might have passed the Senate with
a three vote cushion, and modified the budget bill.' 44
4. Effects of the 1992-93 Budget Impasse
If the California Constitution required only a majority vote to pass
State budget bills, California's 1992-93 budget crisis could have been
resolved as early as April 2, 1992,141 more than two months before the
constitutionally mandated deadline of June 15th. 46 The resulting damage
of the budget impasse to California's credit rating cost the State hundreds
of millions of dollars.47 This needless expense could have been avoided
by a timely budget, since neither Standard and Poor's nor Moody's, two
of the three major credit rating services, downgraded California's credit
rating until July 1992. t48 Therefore, the $200 million or more that
California stands to lose over the next thirty years due to the drop in
California's credit rating, might have been saved if the California
Legislature had passed the 1992-93 State budget on time. 149 Missing the
1992-93 budget deadline also cost Californians the five percent interest
140. See FLOO ROLL CALL VoTE, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, SB 1533 (principal co-author





145. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing the Apr. 2, 1992 passage of AB 2303
by a majority vote).
146. CAL CONST. art IV, § 12(c).
147. See supra notes 72-74 (discussing the cost of California's issuance of registered warrants during
the 1992-93 budget crisis).
148. See supra note 73 (detailing the downgrading of California's credit rating in response to California's
1992-93 budget stalemate).
149. Id.
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that was paid on the $3.4 billion in registered warrants California issued
between July and September. 50
The budget impasse of 1992-93 also could have been resolved on
August 10, 1992 if California's Constitution required a bare majority vote
to pass budget bills.' Unfortunately, California's credit rating could not
have been saved by that time, but the interest on an additional three weeks
worth of registered warrants would have been prevented.'52 Furthermore,
damage to California's reputation as a national economic and political
leader, an effect of the 1992-93 budget battles which is difficult to
translate into a dollar loss, could have been avoided with the timely
passage of a budget.'53
While it remains unclear precisely how much money and prestige
California will lose as a result of its 1992-93 budget crisis, it is certain that
California's weakened economy will play a controlling role in the state's
continuing budgetary crisis. 154 According to California's Commission on
State Finance, California's budget will face significant pressures even if
the economy does begin to improve 5 5 Experts predict that California's
economic condition, which has not been worse since the 1930's, will
150. See supra note 74 (detailing the effects of California's issuance of registered warrants during the
1992-93 State budget crisis).
151. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text (describing the California Senate's Aug. 10, 1992
adoption of a budget conference committee report by a majority vote, but not the two-thirds required).
152. See supra note 73 (describing California's issuance of registered warrants during the 1992-93 State
budget crisis).
153. See Cannon, supra note 74 (characterizing California as a national laughing-stock after its issuance
of registered warrants); see also John Balzar, California's Image: Fad to a Funk, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992,
at Al (reporting that many Americans entertain a diminished perception of California in light of its recent
economic, political and racial difficulties).
154. See El Nasser, supra note 1 and McGuire, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing California's current
economic recession). Shortly after the end of California's 1992-93 budget crisis, Governor Pete Wilson's Deputy
Director of Finance conceded that unless the State economy improved substantially, a budget dilemma for the
1993-94 fiscal year would be likely. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Fiscal Outlook for State Still Shaky, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1992, at Al (reporting predictions of future budgetary problems in the wake of the signing of
California's 1992-93 State budget). Republican Assemblyman Tom McClintock labeled the day after the signing
of the 1992-93 State budget as, "the first day of the next budget crisis." Id.
155. Commission on State Finance, Quarterly General Fund Forecast, at E-17 (June 1993). The
Commission on State Finance, created more than 10 years ago, serves as a bipartisan "fiscal watchdog"
presenting State economic projections independent of both the Governor's Department of Finance and the
Legislature's Legislative Analyst. Statement by State Treasurer Kathleen Brown, California State Treasurer's
Office News Release, July 1, 1993, at 1 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). The 1993-94 California
budget cut $532,000 in funding from the Commission on State Finance. Dan Morain, Wilson Cuts Funding for
State Finance Commission, L.A. TMa.ES, July 2, 1993, at A3. This cut, made via a line item veto by Governor
Wilson, leaves the Commission with only enough money to close itself down. Id.
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continue to stagnate.156  Specifically, economic forecasters predict
California's general economic health will remain weak through 1994.157
Forecasters further predict that California's General Fund will experience
deficits in both the 1992-93 and 1993-94 fiscal years. 158 Early estimates
suggest a budget deficit as great as $9.3 billion, or $300 for every
Californian, by the year 1994.'59
Faced with a 1992-93 budget gap of $10.7 billion, the Legislature
battled for sixty-four days longer than the constitution allots to pass a State
budget. 6° In the 1992-93 budget process, the two-thirds vote requirement
blocked the passage of bills which would have concluded the stalemate
before the constitutionally required deadline.6' Throughout California's
current financial crisis, the two-thirds vote requirement to pass State
budgets has been one of the obstacles to resolving budget conflict.
62
156. See Patrick Lee, U.S., State Economies Still Struggling, L.A. Tam, Sept. 18, 1992, at D1 (reporting
that the release of a UCLA Business Forecasting Project predicted that California's economy will continue to
stagnate). California's current economic slump is worse than the Texas oil bust of the mid-1980's. Id. In it's first
report to President Clinton, the Federal Reserve Board's characterization of California's fiscal outlook was grim.
Constance Sommer, Outlook for State Remains Bleak, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at D2.
157. Commission on State Finance, supra note 155, at El (characterizing California's economic growth
over the next two years as anemic); Commission on State Finance, Quarterly General Fund Forecast, at E2 (Oct.
1992) (summarizing the Commission's prediction of California's economic condition through the 1993-94 fiscal
year); see Matthews, supra note 6 (reporting that the state deficit will exceed the Commission on State Finance's
October 1992 predictions); Weintraub, supra note 4 (indicating that current California economic forecasts would
produce $5 billion less in State revenue than originally anticipated for the period ending June, 1994); Carl Hall,
supra note 2 (noting that southern California, the weakest area in the state, might not recover until 1995).
158. Commission on State Finance, supra note 155, at 153 (predicting that California's current economic
situation will produce future unbalanced budgets); see also Commission on State Finance, supra note 155, at
10 (reporting that General Fund revenues will decline in 1992-93 and 1993-94 before increasing slightly in 1994-
95); see supra note 36 (defining the General Fund and distinguishing it from other funds).
159. Matthews, supra note 7 (quoting predictions made by Elizabeth Hill, the California Legislature's
Legislative Analyst); see supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Legislative Analyst
in the budget process).
160. See Veto Hits California Budget Deal, The Financial Times Ltd., Sept. 2, 1992, at 4 (discussing the
closure of California's budget gap); supra notes 83-110 and accompanying text (discussing the California
budgetary process).
161. See supra notes 119-143 and accompanying text (analyzing bills in the 1992-93 budget process whose
outcome was determined by the supermajority voting requirements).
162. See Keene, supra note 79 (citing the two-thirds majority vote requirement to pass a budget as the
reason why California failed to meet its June 15 budget deadline). Those very close to the budget process
characterized the two-thirds vote requirement as the "ace in the minority's hand" during the 1992-93 budget
process. See Interview, supra note 38; see also supra note 11 (listing other critics of the two-thirds vote
requirement to pass budget bills, who characterize the requirement as a barrier to timely budget solutions).
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IM. ELIMINATING THE TwO-THIRDS VOTE REQUIREMENT
TO PASS CALIFORNIA'S BUDGET
The California Legislature has a long and consistent history of missing
budget deadlines, even during robust economic times.163 With budgetary
problems anticipated for years to come, California faces its worst economic
future since the great Depression."6 The Legislature is also notoriously
divided along party lines.1 65 There is simply no reason for immediate
optimism that the two-thirds vote requirement will be any less significant
in the California Legislature's efforts to pass the 1994-95 State budget or
any other future state budget.'66 The California Constitution will continue
to still require a two-thirds vote to pass a State budget. 67 According to
political insiders, California's budget process evolves in response to
crisis.1 68 California is currently facing an economic crisis, and it is time
for California's budgetary process to evolve accordingly.'
69
Given the tough economic road ahead, budgetary reform will be critical
in dealing with California's upcoming financial difficulties. 7 ° Tough
choices must be made to deal with California's fiscal dilemma. The current
requirement of a two-thirds vote to pass budget legislation operates as a
roadblock to achieving consensus and passing fiscal legislation171
163. See California State Retirements Insufficient to Prevent Layoffs, supra note 10, at 781 and
accompanying text (noting that in 19 out of the last 22 years, California's Legislature has failed to enact the
State budget by the constitutionally specified deadline).
164. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (documenting California's current and predicted future
economic crisis).
165. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing a recent study revealing the highly partisan nature
of the California Legislature).
166. See Matthews, supra note 6 (noting that the California Legislature's Legislative Analyst. Elizabeth
Hill, predicted that the 1994 deficit may be as high as $9.3 billion). As long as the minority political party
retains at least one-third of the seats in the California Legislature, it can frustrate efforts to pass the budget.
BELL, supra note 69, at 260 (discussing the partisanship of the California budget process).
167. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d).
168. Interview, supra note 39 (characterizing California's budget process).
169. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text (detailing California's predicted poor economic
outlook).
170. See Commission on State Finance, supra note 155, at El (concluding that California must include
budgetary reform as part of the solution to the budget crisis); CALIFORNIA LEGISLATtURE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
BUDarGE CoiiMrrEE, supra note 33, at 3 (suggesting that California must mix changes in internal procedures,
state statutes and the state Constitution in order to resolve the increasing difficulty in developing the budget).
171. Alvin Solokow, University of California at Davis, Professor of Political Science, credits a deadlocked
government with blocking effective resolution of current budgetary shortfalls. Kershner, supra note 4 (quoting
Professor Solokow); see supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of supermajority voting
requirements). In the context of the 1992-93 budget process, the two-thirds vote prevented the passage of budget
bills in April, May, and August of 1992. See supra notes 120-138 (discussing the roles of AB 2303 and SB 1280
in the 1992-93 budget process). The requirement further prevented passage of budget revisions in September
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
The California Constitution mandates a simple majority vote to pass
most bills, allowing a majority of the Legislature to establish policy in
sensitive areas such as crime, the environment, and industry.'72 A
majority of those persons elected by the citizens of the State of California
should also be sufficient to set policy in the form of passing budgets. 173
The California Constitution already provides the Legislature with the
authority to spend nearly one-half of California's budget by a majority
vote.' 74 Requiring more than a simple majority vote in the area of
budgeting, as the California Constitution currently does, often results in
"tyranny by the minority," especially in a crisis like the one currently
confronting California's economy because of pressure on the Legislature
to respond to the crisis via budgetary solutions."
Arguments for retaining the two-thirds vote requirement are based upon
a fear that requiring a simple majority vote will in fact result in "tyranny
by the majority. ' 17 6 Specifically, critics argue that eliminating the super
majority requirement would allow a bare majority of California's
1992; supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (examining the role of SB 1533 in the 1992-93 budget
process).
172. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b) (requiring a majority vote of both the California Assembly and the
Senate to pass bills); see also supra note 21 (describing instances where the California Constitution specifically
requires a majority vote of the Legislature). But see CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d) (requiring that the Legislature
pass any bill appropriating money from California's General Fund, except those funding public schools, by a
two-thirds vote regardless of subject).
173. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the policy role of a state budget).
174. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d) (exempting appropriations for public schools from the two-thirds
vote requirement). California's 1993-94 State budget devoted $18.5 billion or 48.1% of the State's total budget
to education. Pete Wilson, Governor of California, California State Budget 1993-94 at 3 (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal). An alternative to eliminating the two-thirds vote requirement to pass appropriations bills,
which includes the Budget Bill, would be to simply exempt state budgets from the two-thirds vote requirement.
See infra notes 247-252 (discussing Assembly Constitutional Amendment (ACA) 3, which proposes to exempt
the Budget Bill from the two-thirds vote requirement).
175. See Peter Schrag, Why California Doesn't Work: Constitutional Gridlock, 255 THE NAnON 390 (Oct.
12, 1992) (discussing the power the minority party has in a constitutionally gridlocked government). Tyranny
by the minority describes a scenario where a group in the minority has the power to control the majority. Id.
In the case of a Legislature, the term refers specifically to *situations where there are so many obstacles in the
way of enacting legislation that the minority party has the ability to hold power, like a refusal to agree, over the
heads of the majority. d The result has been described as a dangerous perversion of democracy. Id. California
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown has described one of the problems in resolving budgetary problems as "you
can't get the Republicans to vote for anything." Douglas Shuit, Speaker's Plea for Easing of Tax Law Given
Little Hope, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at pt. I p. 3. See supra note 39 (commenting on the power that the two-
thirds vote requirement gives the minority party). But see Joel Fox, When is Majority Rule Too Easy?, L.A.
Tmbm, Feb. 18, 1992, at B5 (arguing that supermajority vote requirements provide important protections).
176. See Fox, supra note 175 (arguing that supermajority voting requirements were designed to give
certainty to significant decisions and to protect the rights of minorities). But see ZEmAN, supra note 39, at 248
(characterizing supermajority voting requirements as being as threatening to democratic government as they are
protective of it).
1993 / Enacting The California State Budget
legislators to control the State's budget and lawmaking. Removing the two-
thirds vote requirement to pass California budgets, however, would not
leave the power of the majority in the Legislature unchecked. 177 The
California Constitution already addresses concerns about excessive power
in the hands of the California Legislature through procedural checks and
balances between the executive and legislative branches. 78 For example,
even if only a simple majority vote were required to pass California State
budgets, the Governor would still have the power to veto any bill
presented by the Legislature. 179 The Governor would also retain the
power of the line item veto.'80 Moreover, the Legislature retains the
power to override the Governor's veto by a two-thirds vote.' 8 '
Opponents of reducing the vote requirement further argue that the
Governor could veto California's budget, and the Legislature would still
need a two-thirds vote to override such a veto; consequently, a consensus
of two-thirds of the Legislature would effectively still be needed to pass
budgets.'82 Critics also argue that since the Constitution has always
required a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to override a veto, the two-
thirds vote requirement to pass budgets should be retained.'83 This
argument misses the point. The critical problem confronting California is
the initial passage of the budget, not the effect of veto or veto override
requirements. The effect of a simple majority vote requirement to pass
State budgets, and a supermajority to override a veto would likely be
positive, not negative. The Governor would be forced to take a public
position and be subjected to public scrutiny for blocking a budget endorsed
by a majority of California's Legislature. It would be the Governor, not
Legislative gridlock, preventing the enactment of a California State budget.
Republican members of California's Legislature also argue that
retaining the two-thirds vote requirements serves Californians well by
177. See infra notes 178-181 and accompanying text (discussing procedural protections already in place
that promote a balance of power between the California Legislature and Governor).
178. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing for the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches). No person empowered to use the powers of one branch may use the powers of another, unless the
constitution provides otherwise. Id. The purpose of a constitutional system of checks and balances is to make
it difficult for a majority to form and govern without considerable support. ZELmAN supra note 39, at 248.
179. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 10.
180. See id. art. IV, § 10(e) (allowing the Governor to reduce or strike one or more items in appropriations
bills).
181. Id. art. IV, § 10.
182. See Dan Bernstein, Two-Thirds Vote Aids Budget Gridlock, Opponents Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr.
5, 1993, at A4 (reporting arguments on both sides of the two-thirds vote requirement issue).
183. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. IV, § 17; CAL. CONST. of 1879 art. IV, § 16 (providing the Legislature with
the power to override a Governor's veto by a two-thirds vote).
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making it harder to raise taxes."'I While budgetary issues inevitably
involve taxation, this argument proves too much. The two-thirds vote
required to raise taxes, which has a separate place in California's
Constitution, 18 is not the problem at hand. Again, the specific problem
is the initial passage of California's budget. A requirement that cost
Californians hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1992-93 budget process
and made California the laughing stock of our nation does no service to
Californians. 18
6
A majority vote requirement would enable the Legislature to enact
more effective budgets. Under the current budget process, participants must
make such extreme compromises to satisfy the minority that Legislators
may be forced to withdraw effective solutions. The concessions which the
majority party must make in order to achieve the necessary two-thirds vote
often increase the level of expenditures, thereby producing a larger budget
overall.187 If California's Constitution did not force the majority party to
cater to demands of the minority party, the majority party might feel more
free to offer its best suggestions without being concerned about seeking
minority approval. 88
At a time when the California economy demands consensus and
agreement to reach budgetary solutions, further restricting the California
Legislature by retaining the two-thirds vote requirement to pass State
budgets is extremely difficult to justify.'89 In light of the procedural
safeguards already in place, the California Legislature's sixty-four day
budget fiasco during the summer of 1992, and California's weakened
economy, California should follow the lead of an overwhelming majority
of American states and reduce the vote requirement to pass State budgets
to a simple majority."9 Several alternative methods exist to reform
184. Bernstein, supra note 182; see supra notes 145-162 and accompanying text (discussing the effects
of the 1992-93 budget delay).
185. CAL. CoNsr. art. XIIIA, § 3.
186. See Cannon, supra note 74.
187. Bernard L. Hyink, California Revises Its Constitution, 22 W. POL. Q. 637,645 (discussing the effects
of the two-thirds vote requirement to pass California State budgets). The requirement played a controversial role
in the 1960's Constitutional Revision Commission's deliberations on Article IV of California's Constitution. Id.;
see infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text (describing the Constitutional Revision Commission).
188. Bernstein, supra note 182.
189. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (noting predictions for California's economic future);
supra notes 111-144 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the two-thirds vote requirement on the
1992-93 budget process).
190. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting that California is one of a slim minority of
states that require supermajority votes to pass state budgets). For a State budget to become effective immediately,
either an exemption to the standard urgency rule must be made or the Budget Bill must go into effect
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California's budgetary process by removing the two-thirds vote require-
ment from the California Constitution, including a Constitutional Revision
Commission, constitutional convention, and citizen's initiative.19' The
first method available to eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement is the
Constitutional Revision Commission.
A. Constitutional Revision Commission
The Constitutional Revision Commission method, used extensively in
the 1960's, involves bringing together community leaders and legislators
as delegates to discuss changing the California Constitution to better meet
the needs of the people. 92 The Constitutional Revision Commission has
been one of the most important vehicles for recommending changes to the
California Constitution. 93 By 1960, for example, the California
Constitution contained about 80,000 words and was the second longest of
immediately without the help of the urgency clause. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c)(1) (providing that most bills
go into effect on January 1 following a 90-day waiting period from the statute's date of enactment). Because
the Budget Bill must currently be enacted as an urgency statute, merely eliminating the two-thirds vote
requirement to pass the budget would not alone remedy the problem because urgency statutes must also receive
a two-thirds vote to pass. Id. § 12(c) (requiring the Legislature to pass the budget by June 15); id. § 8(d)
(specifying that urgency statutes must pass by a two-thirds vote). An exemption to the urgency clause would
alter California's current Constitutional requirement and therefore a constitutional amendment would be
necessary to bring about such an exemption. Id. Similarly, for the Budget Bill to go into effect immediately
without an urgency clause a constitutional amendment would also be needed. Id. § 12 (failing to provide that
the Budget bill is an exception to the general rule providing when bills go into effect). See supra note 33
(explaining the three methods that the California Constitution provides for change).
191. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATuRE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGEr COMMITTEE, supra note 33, at 18 (setting
forth three available methods of changing California's Constitution).
192. See CAL. CONST. art. XVHI (establishing the methods of amending or revising the California
Constitution); STOWE, supra note 87, at 48-49 (discussing methods of changing California's constitution);
HYINK, supra note 187, at 641 (reviewing the appointment of California's 1963 Constitutional Revision
Commission); supra note 33 (distinguishing between a constitutional amendment and a revision).
193. See Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California's Constitution, 3 CALIFORNIA POLICY SEMINAR (CPS)
BRIEF, April 1991, at 4 (discussing the role of the 1963 Constitutional Revision Commission in changing the
California Constitution). Eugene Lee is a professor emeritus of the Department of Political Science, University
of California, Berkeley dhd served as the Director of the Institute of Governmental Affairs from 1967 to 1988.
Id. at 7; Judge Bruce Sumner, Constitution Revision by Commission in California, STATE GOVERNMENT, Spring
1972, at 135 (analyzing the work of the Constitutional Revision Commission created in 1963). Judge Sumner
served as the Chairman of the Commission. Id. The mission of the 1963 Commission was to provide the
Legislature with facts and recommendations on revising California's Constitution. Id; Hyink, supra note 187,
at 642-654 (describing the extensive efforts of the Constitution Revision Commission during the 1960's); Ira
Reiner & George Size, The Law Through a Looking Glass: Our Supreme Court and the Use and Abuse of the
California Declaration of Rights; 23 PAC. L.J. 1183, 1249 (1992) (characterizing the creation of the
Constitutional Revision Commission as the beginning of California's process of constitutional revision).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
any state.19 As a result of the Commission's efforts, which ended in
1971, all but two articles were revised and more than 40,000 words were
deleted from the California Constitution. 195
The first step in using the Constitutional Revision Commission process
to eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement to pass state budgets, is for
the Legislature to assemble a commission to study the requirement.1
96
The 1963 Commission operated independently from the Legislature and
selected its own chairperson, created its own rules and procedures, and
reported its findings directly to the Legislature.' 97  A modem
Constitutional Revision Commission should be similarly structured. All
recommendations of the Commission must receive approval from
two-thirds of the Legislature in order to be placed on the ballot for voter
consideration.'98 Only a simple majority of voters is required to adopt
such recommendations. 99
The Constitutional Revision Commission approach has several
advantages. First, the Commission allows for in-depth study of the
ramifications of eliminating the two-thirds vote requirement to enact state
budgets." 0 Second, the Commission's diverse membership tends to
reduce the politics and partisanship that may accompany other methods,
specifically a constitutional convention. 20 1 Finally, the Commission's
members will work in conjunction with members of the Legislature to
devise solutions. 2 The Commission method is a community effort to
create solutions to a problem affecting the State as a whole.
194. Hyink, supra note 187, at 640. During this period the California Constitution was 12 times longer
than the United States Constitution. Id. Article XI alone, dealing with local government, was longer than the
United States Constitution. Id.
195. Lee, supra note 193, at 7.
196. TURNER, supra note 15, at 31 (discussing the process of establishing constitution revision
commissions). The 1963 Commission was made up of 60 members appointed by the Joint Committee on
Legislative Organization as well as three Assembly members, and three Senators. Hyink, supra note 187, at 641
(describing the composition of the Commission). The Commission's other members included a former Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, several former legislators, two past presidents of the State Bar, the
president of the state AFL-CIO, three university and college presidents, and six past presidents of the League
of Women Voters. Id.
197. Sumner, supra note 193, at 135; Hyink, supra note 187, at 641.
198. See CAL. CoNsr. art. XVIII, § I (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to propose any
amendment or revision to the Constitution).
199. Id. arL XVnI, § 4.
200. Sumner, supra note 193, at 138.
201. Id. The Commission method also tends to be less expensive than a constitutional convention. Id.; see
infra notes 206-215 and accompanying text (discussing eliminating the two-thirds vote requirement via a
constitutional convention).
202. See BEEK, supra note 27, at 235 (discussing a citizen's role in the Legislature).
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A downside to utilizing a Commission is that the Legislature may be
constrained by the very ills it will be trying to correct. The reality is that,
while hardly impossible, the process of constitutional revision is acutely
political.2 3 The Legislature may not be able to gather the support of
two-thirds of its members to act on proposals that eliminate a two-thirds
vote requirement for passing California budgets.2 4 Another drawback to
the Commission method is that it may take many months or even years.
As a result, by the time a Commission studies the two-thirds vote
requirement and makes a recommendation, public interest may have
declined and consensus may be difficult to achieve. 5
Utilizing the Constitutional Revision Commission method to eliminate
the two-thirds vote requirement to pass State budgets requires the
California Legislature to overcome the very obstacle that it is trying to
correct. Considering the difficulty the California Legislature has had in
achieving a consensus of two-thirds of its membership to pass budgets, it
seems unlikely that, if a Constitutional Revision Commission were formed,
the Commission's recommendations would be implemented. Another
method available to eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement is the
constitutional convention.
B. Constitutional Convention
The purpose of a constitutional convention is different from that of a
Constitutional Revision Commission.2" A constitutional convention
allows delegates the freedom to propose rewrites of the entire California
constitution. 2 7 To establish such a convention, the Legislature must first
approve, by a two-thirds vote, a ballot measure asking California voters
203. Lee, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the characteristics of constitutional revision).
204. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text (discussing the negative implications of supermajority
voting requirements).
205. Sumner, supra note 193, at 138.
206. See JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1-2 (1972)
(reprinting the original 1887 version) (discussing the general purposes of Constitutional conventions).
207. WINSToN W. CRoUCH, ET AL. CALFORNIA GONmENT AND PoUTCS 34 (6th ed. 1972) (describing
amending the California Constitution by convention). Convention delegates, however, are subject to the same
political pressures facing members of legislative branches. CI sENS LEGISLATE ADVISORY COMMISSION,
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATuR FINAL REPORT TO THE CALIFoRNIA LEGISLATURE AND TO THE CMZENs OF
CALIFORNIA, March 1962, at 43 (discussing why constitutional conventions are not always the most practical
method of constitutional reform).
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whether a convention should be called.2 °8 If the calling of a convention
is approved by a majority of voters, delegates will be chosen by the
people, and, ultimately, the recommendations of the convention must be
submitted directly to the voters for approval.2 9
A constitutional convention allows for sweeping reform outside of
procedural roadblocks, such as the two-thirds vote requirement, that
prevents the Legislature from acting.2"0 Once the initial hurdle of calling
the convention is crossed, a convention would allow for change within the
shortest timelines and would be the most efficient.21 Using a
constitutional convention, however, has several drawbacks.
Considering that the two-thirds vote requirement to pass State budgets
is found in only one provision of the California Constitution, a
constitutional convention is probably too broad an alternative to eliminate
one constitutional provision.1 2 Conventions are typically called to make
widespread reform, and limiting a convention to one issue would be very
difficult.213 Furthermore, it would be financially impractical to call a
208. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. The last constitutional convention was called in 1878. Hyink, supra note
15, at 19 (discussing California's Constitutional Convention of 1878). Voter approval of the 1878 constitutional
convention was a response to the growing social and economic conflict, in part stemming from the Depression
of 1873. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the social climate
surrounding the Constitutional convention of 1878). Compare ANDREw F. ROLLE, CALIFORNIA, A HISTORY 405-
412 (1963) (describing California's second Constitutional convention) with id. at 228-232 (characterizing the
Constitutional Convention of 1849, which drafted California's first constitution, as a response to a combination
of Congress' third refusal to provide statehood for California and the swelling desire of Californians for a
constitutional convention); see also supra note 15 (commenting on the differences between the Constitution of
1879 and the Constitution of 1849). In 1898, 1914, 1920, and 1930, California voters rejected proposals made
by the Legislature to call constitutional conventions. Hyink, supra note 187, at 639.
209. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (requiring a majority vote of the voters to authorize the calling of
a constitutional convention). Delegates to the convention must have the same qualifications as members of the
Legislature. The California Constitution requires approval by a majority of voters for a proposed amendment
or revision to go into effect. Id art. XVIII, § 4; see also supra note 33 (discussing the difference between a
constitutional amendment and revision).
210. CALIFORNIALEGISLATuREJOINT LEGISt.ATIVEBUDGETCOMMrITEE,supra note 33, at2l (describing
the degree of change possible through a constitutional convention). Yet the chances of a convention making wild
and reckless changes are minor. BARRY KEENE, TlE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENTAL GRIDOcK AND THE NEED
FOR A CONs'ITrUToNAL CONVEN77ON 7 (1992) (published by The Center for California Studies, California State
University, Sacramento) [hereinafter Dangers]. Barry Keene is the former California Senate Majority Leader.
Id. at 8; see Barry Keene, Plaform, The People's Choice, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at M5 [hereinafter
Platform] (characterizing a constitutional convention as a no-risk solution).
211. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE JOINT LEGISLATVE BUDGET COMMITTEE, supra note 33, at 22.
212. See id (noting the impracticality of calling a constitutional convention solely to address fiscal issues),
Once convened, it is difficult to limit the scope of the convention or the recommendations it makes. Platform,
supra note 210, at 2.
213. CALIFORNIA LEGISt.ATURE JOINT LEGisLATIVE BUDGET COMMITEE, supra note 33, at 21.
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state-wide constitutional convention to address only one issue."' Lastly,
those close to the process suggest that changing a constitution tends to be
intensely political, and the risks to existing governmental structures might
be too serious to leave in the hands of such a convention. 25  A third
alternative, the citizen's initiative, combines some of the positive attributes
from both the Constitutional Revision Commission and constitutional
convention and is likely to be the best method for eliminating the two-
thirds vote requirement to pass State budgets.
C. Citizen's Initiative
The initiative process may be the only way to circumvent the
constraints of the Constitutional Revision Commission approach and the
constitutional convention.216 By employing the initiative process, the
mandate to remove the two-thirds vote requirement to pass California
budgets would originate directly from the people.217
Those supporting change through the initiative process cite notions of
self-governance by popular decision making.218 More importantly,
observers of the initiative process assert that it is an effective way to
214. Id.; see Sumner, supra note 193, at 138 (noting that the convention method of constitutional revision
is more expensive than other methods like the Constitutional Revision Commission).
215. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE JoiNr LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITnEE, supra note 33, at 21. Those
close to the process characterize a constitutional convention as a "freewheeling device." Id.
216. See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text (discussing how the two-thirds vote requirement to
implement both Constitutional Revision Commission recommendations or pose the question of calling a
constitutional convention may make it more difficult to remove the two-thirds vote requirement to pass
California budgets); supra note 32 (setting forth California's initiative process).
217. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (reserving to the people the power of initiative); Charles Bell & Charles
Price, Are Ballot Measures the Magic Ride to Success?, CA GOV'T & POLTICS ANN., at 93 (1992-93) (noting
that citizens turn to the initiative process to achieve change while not involving the government). Elected
officials historically used mechanisms for change existing within the legislative and executive branches. Id.
218. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERs OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A
LEGACY LOST? 85 (1984) (discussing the arguments supporting direct legislation). Decisions embodying the will
of the people are considered the most legitimate of all. Id.; see Kara Christenson, Comment, Interpreting the
Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASINGS LJ. 1031, 1034 (1989) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of the initiative process).
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overcome legislative inactivity.2"9 Furthermore, law passed by initiatives
also tends to be more permanent than law enacted by the Legislature. 2 0
Opponents argue that even though initiatives can only encompass one
subject,221 voters are not equipped to respond responsibly to the complex
issues presented by many initiatives.222 Critics further insist that
initiatives sidestep important legislative processes such as deliberation,
discussion, and compromise which are desirable to effective law
making.22' Lastly, critics contend that special interest groups have taken
over the initiative process.224
In spite of these general criticisms, use of the initiative process to
eliminate a two-thirds vote requirement that produced legislative gridlock
for sixty-four days during the summer of 1992 would avoid the very
problem that led to the stalemate. 22' Legislative deliberation, discussion,
and compromise is precisely what is not needed to deal with the two-thirds
vote requirement to pass budgets.226 Utilizing the initiative process would
eliminate the need to have two-thirds of the Legislature vote to place
Constitutional Revision Commission recommendations on the ballot or
219. D. MAGLEBY, DIREcr LEGISLATION 28 (1984); see Bell & Price, supra note 217 (citing reasons why
state elected officials turn to the initiative process). Specifically, conservative Republicans in the California
Legislature have turned to the initiative process as a means of aggravating Democrats and circumventing tight
Democratic party control while still implementing Republican policy goals. Id. at 94.
220. See Bell & Price, supra note 217, at 94-95 (listing permanence of change as an advantage of the
initiative process and one reason why many state office holders use the initiative process). Changes through
initiatives are not amendable, except by voter approval, which is the reason such changes are more permanent
than laws passed by the Legislature. Id.
221. CAL. CONST. art. It, § 8(d) (stating that initiatives dealing with more than one subject cannot be put
before the voters and have no effect).
222. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 218, at 86.
223. MAGLEBY, supra note 219, at 29-30; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 218,
at 85.
224. Jerry Roberts & Susan Yoachum, Some Say Initiative Process Is a Mess, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1990,
at A8 (characterizing the initiative process as the will of special interests rather than the will of the people). The
increased influence of special interests is undermining the initiative process as a grass-roots campaign for change,
the purpose for which the process was designed. Id. See generally Charles Price & Robert Waste, Initiatives:
Too Much of a Good Thing?, CA. Gov'T. & POLICS ANN., 1992-93, at 96 (discussing factors pointing to the
need for reform of California's initiative process).
225. See Bernstein, supra note 182 (reporting that reducing the vote requirement to pass state budgets
would probably need to be done via the initiative process); Activists Urge Major State Budget Reforms, UPI,
Apr. 1, 1993 (available on LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File, keyword: CA-BUDGET) (noting that eliminating
the supermajority vote requirement by means other than a ballot initiative would be difficult since minority
Republicans would block such measures in the Legislature); supra notes 111-144 and accompanying text
(discussing the 1992-93 budget process which lasted 64 days longer than allowed by law).
226. See supra notes 176-181 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural protections that would
remain in effect even if the two-thirds vote requirement were removed).
100
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vote to put forth the question of calling a constitutional convention.?
Moreover, a simple initiative that confronted only the very narrow problem
of the supermajority vote requirement to pass California budgets would
address the criticism that voters cannot effectively understand the
ramifications of modern initiatives.
While the initiative process is an attractive means of eliminating the
two-thirds vote requirement, as a practical matter, getting an initiative on
the ballot and approved by the voters is a complicated, multi-step
process. 228  In order to maximize the chances of success, an initiative
proposing to eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement should be sponsored
by a bipartisan group of community leaders. By crossing party lines, a
group representing both sides of the political aisle would be better suited
to cut through the rhetoric accompanying most initiatives. A bipartisan
group would also be in a much better position to raise the funds necessary
to get the initiative qualified for the ballot because of its ability to draw
funds from sources on both sides of the political aisle. The cost of an
initiative would certainly be less than the cost of California's budgetary
delays.
227. See Bell & Price, supra note 217, at 94 (discussing how elected officials are increasingly turning to
the initiative process to achieve policy goals while bypassing the increasingly gridlocked and partisan formal
channels); supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (describing the partisan nature of the California
Legislature).
228. See supra note 33 (describing the general process of getting an initiative on the ballot and approved).
Any citizen interested in pursuing a change in the California Constitution or a statute may begin the process by
submitting his or her proposal to the Secretary of State. CAL. CONST. art. U, § 8(a) (providing that the initiative
is the power of the voters); id at § 8(b) (requiring that initiative measures be presented to the Secretary of State).
Following submission to the Secretary of State, the California Attorney General prepares an official title and a
summary of the proposed initiative which includes any financial impacts of the measure. Lee, supra note 33,
at 234. The first major hurdle facing the sponsor of an initiative is gathering the appropriate signatures that the
California Constitution requires to place the measure on the ballot. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b) (requiring
signatures equal to 8% of the votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election to qualify
a constitutional amendment for the ballot). Initiatives proposing solely statutory changes require only signatures
equaling 5% of the votes. Id. Since the number of signatures needed to qualify is so large, usually between
500,000 and 1,000,000, an overwhelming majority of initiatives have qualified for the ballot have done so with
the help of professional signature gathering firms. Lee, supra note 33, at 235. These firms act as campaign
managers, doing everything from hiring petition circulators to soliciting campaign contributions to pay for the
initiatives. Id. Utilizing either of two firms renowned for their success, Kimball Petition Management, Inc. or
American Petition Consultants, virtually guarantees qualification on the ballot. Id. at 234. This success rate
comes with a hefty price tag, with initiative campaigns sometimes costing more than $1 million, or
approximately $1 or $2 for every signature. Id. at 236. The battle does not end when a measure is qualified for
the ballot or even approved. Successfully approved initiatives often need to be implemented by statute. Id. at
241. Initiatives approved by California voters must frequently withstand judicial review as well. Id. at 242. See
generally Douglas C. Michael, Note, Pre[-Election Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection,
71 CAL. L. REv. 1216 (1983) (arguing that the pre-election review of initiatives is necessary to adequately
protect voters).
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A narrowly-tailored initiative dealing with the single subject of the
two-thirds vote requirement to enact state budgets would likely be upheld
in court.229 The initiative itself should be very simple, proposing that
California state budgets go into effect immediately and require only a
majority vote of the Legislature to pass.20 Courts will generally not
intervene in disputes over an initiative's constitutionality before an
election, but a court will step in before an election to weigh procedural
objections.2' Therefore, the only attack that opponents of such an
initiative could make before the election would have to be on procedural
grounds. The group sponsoring the initiative must, as a result, pay careful
attention to following the correct procedures. The help of professional
initiative managers can be obtained to eliminate such procedural concerns.
The remaining challenge that opponents of the initiative could make
could only focus on the measure's constitutionality. In the past, the court
has struck down or limited initiatives which violated the "single subject
rule" or granted powers to the Legislature in violation of the California
Constitution.z 2 The initiative should address only a single issue:
changing the vote requirement to pass a bill. Voting requirements have
been successfully changed in the past.23 Consequently, an initiative
proposing to eliminate the two-thirds requirement to pass California
budgets, if attacked in court, would very likely be upheld. Given the
serious side effects of the two-thirds vote requirement, if an initiative were
presented before California voters, it seems likely the voters would
approve it. Members of the California Legislature have taken note of these
side effects and have recently acted to attempt to remove the two-thirds
vote requirement. 2 4
229. See Lee, supra note 33, at 242-48 (discussing the increased judicial scrutiny that courts give
initiatives). Professor Lee characterizes the end of the line for initiatives to be not the voters, but the California
Supreme Court. Id. at 242.
230. See supra note 26 (defining an urgency statute); supra note 190 (discussing urgency statutes and why
the California budget must be passed as an urgency statute).
231. See Lee, supra note 33, at 242 (quoting California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin).
232. Id.
233. See supra note 34 (detailing specific instances where ballot initiatives have changed the requirements
to pass certain bills).
234. CaliforniaBillTracking, 1993-94 RegularSession, Senate Constitutional Amendment (SCA) 1 (1992).
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (documenting the Dec. 7, 1992 introduction of SCA I by Senator
Kopp, an Independent from San Francisco); California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly
Constitutional Amendment (ACA) 2 (1992), available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (documenting the Dec.
7, 1992 introduction of ACA 2 by Assembly Member Hannigan, a Democrat representing District 4); California
Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 3 (1993), available in LEXIS,
Cal Library, Catrck file (listing the Feb. 1, 1993 introduction of ACA 3 by Assembly Member Richter, a
Republican from Chico). In the California Legislature's 1991-92 Regular Session, Senator Lockyer introduced
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D. Current Efforts to Eliminate the Two-Thirds Vote Requirement
Early in the 1993-94 Regular Session, members of the California
Legislature introduced three constitutional amendments that would affect
California's budget process. 5 One of these amendments, Senate
Constitutional Amendment (SCA) 1, proposed to exempt appropriations in
the budget bill from the two-thirds vote requirement.236 The second of
the amendments, Assembly Constitutional Amendment (ACA) 2, provided
that statutes enacting budget bills would go into effect immediately, thus
eliminating the two-thirds vote requirement.237 The third amendment,
ACA 3, simply proposes to exempt the budget bill from the two-thirds
vote requirement.238
If the Legislature had passed SCA 1 and the voters had approved it, the
amendment would have eliminated the two-thirds vote requirement to pass
California state budgets.239 The full Senate passed SCA 1 on June 17,
1993, and sent it to the Assembly.240 On June 20, 1993, the Assembly
gutted SCA 1, removing the language that would have eliminated the two-
thirds vote requirement to pass state budgets." SCA 1 now merely
SCA 6, which proposed to reduce to a majority the vote requirement to pass state budgets. California Bill
Tracking, 1991-92 Regular Session, Senate Constitutional Amendment 6 (1990), available in LEXIS, Cal
Library, Catrck file (reflecting the Dec. 17, 1990 introduction of SCA 6 by Senator Lockyer). The amendment
passed the Senate, but failed to pass the Assembly. lId During that session, Assembly Member O'Connell also
introduced a similar constitutional amendment in the Assembly. California Bill Tracking, 1990-91 Regular
Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 7 (1990), available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file
(documenting the Dec. 3, 1990, introduction of ACA 7 by Assembly Member O'Connell, a Democrat from
Sacramento). ACA 7 proposed to delete the requirement that appropriations from the General Fund pass by a
two-thirds vote, thereby allowing State budgets to be passed by a simple majority vote. Id The Assembly Rules
Committee received the bill on Feb. 7, 1991, but the amendment was not referred to another committee for
hearing, thus, it never reached the Assembly floor for a vote. Id.
235. See supra note 234 (discussing recent attempts by the Legislature to eliminate the two-thirds vote
requirement to pass California budgets).
236. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Senate Constitutional Amendment 1 (1992),
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (summarizing the effects of SCA 1). The amendment also proposed
to amend the California Constitution to require members of the Legislature and the Governor to give up any
salary or reimbursement for travel and living expenses during any time beyond June 15 that California is without
a state budget. Id
237. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 2 (1992),
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (summarizing the effects of ACA 2); see supra note 190 (explaining
why the Legislature must currently enact the budget bill as an urgency statute).
238. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 3 (1993),
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (listing the Feb. 1, 1993 introduction of ACA 3 by Assembly
Member Richter, a Republican from Chico).
239. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Senate Constitutional Amendment 1 (1993),
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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proposes the addition of a new section to the California Constitution
relating to taxation."
After the December 7, 1992 introduction of ACA 2, the bill sat idle for
more than two months until February 1993 when it was referred to the
Assembly Ways and Means Committee.243 That committee scheduled
ACA 2 for hearing twice in March 1993 and twice in April 1993.244 In
May 1993, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee approved ACA
2.245 After a third reading, the Assembly referred ACA 2 to the inactive
file on August 31, 1993.246 ACA 2 is now effectively dead.
The third amendment, ACA 3, does not propose the elimination of the
two-thirds vote requirement to pass appropriations bills.247 ACA 3 simply
proposes to exempt the Budget Bill from the two-thirds vote
requirement." Moreover, ACA 3 specifies that statutes enacting a
Budget Bill would go into effect immediately upon their enactment.249
This important second component to ACA 3 would eliminate the need to
formally enact California budgets as urgency bills.20 As a result, only
a simple majority vote of the Legislature would be necessary to pass state
budgets.
As of August 23, 1993, ACA 3 was waiting to be heard in the
Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment & Constitutional
Amendments." Should both the Assembly and the Senate pass ACA 3,
it will then be put before California voters, who must approve the
amendment by a majority vote to make ACA 3 effective. z 2 In light of
the fact that the California Legislature must approve ACA 3 by the very
two-thirds vote requirement it is trying to eliminate, the probability of
242. Id. SCA 1, in its current version, would impose an additional V% sales tax, the proceeds of which
are designated exclusively for public safety. Id.
243. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 2 (1993),




247. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 3 (1993),
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 26 (defining urgency statutes); supra notes 92-93 (comparing urgency bills to non-
urgency bills).
251. California Bill Tracking, 1993-94 Regular Session, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 3 (1993)
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Catrck file (listing the dates of action taken on ACA 3).
252. CAL. CONST. art. XVi~i, § 4; see supra note 33 (discussing the process by which the California
Legislature may amend or revise the California Constitution).
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exempting the budget from the two-thirds vote requirement via ACA 3 is
small.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Constitution is riddled with instances where two-thirds
of the Legislature must agree before a bill may be passed. 2 3 These
supermajority vote requirements have hampered the California
Legislature's ability to effectively resolve issues confronting the State.2 4
Presently, the two-thirds vote requirement to pass California state budgets
hinders the Legislature's ability to pass budgets by the constitutionally
mandated deadline. A majority of the California Legislature, which the
Constitution vests with authority to dictate policy in a vast majority of
areas and to spend nearly one-half of California's total budget,2 55 ought
to be sufficient to create fiscal policy for the State.
In these times of economic hardship, Californians need to remove the
two-thirds vote requirement to enact state budgets. Doing so would make
the Legislature's job of establishing the budget easier while still preserving
democratic rule. Maintaining the two-thirds vote requirement to pass
budgets is likely to cause only further delay and gridlock in passing the
most important piece of legislation the Legislature introduces.
The initiative process is the most viable method available to eliminate
the two-thirds vote requirement. Initiatives are truly the voice of the
people. California's citizens deserve better than a Legislature consistently
disregarding its constitutional responsibility to pass budgets by June 15.
While initiatives are not without their costs, these costs would undoubtedly
be less than those that will likely follow from the 1992-93 budget process.
Regardless of how the two-thirds vote requirement is removed, the idea of
future gridlock, cost, and embarrassment to Californians should be reason
enough to remove the requirement.
Kevin S. Rosenberg
253. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing situations where California's Constitution
requires a two-thirds vote to pass certain types of legislation).
254. See, e.g., supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the Legislature to
enact property tax reform in the late 1970's).
255. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that the current version of the California
Constitution vests the Legislature with the power to appropriate funds for education which totals 48.1% of the
1993-94 California budget by a majority vote only).

